J. Daniel Plants, Baylor University

1989 - Punishment Paradigms : Pros and Cons

There has been a veritable cornucopia of literature in recent years devoted to theoretical refinements of the role of counterplans in debate. Indeed, these expositions have spawned an entirely new lexicon of counterplan species: hypothetical, conditional, dispositional, permutable, capturable, etc. As necessary as this discussion has been, however, sorely lacking has been any questioning of the more fundamental assumptions of the role of the counterplan in debate. Especially in practice, there is the conspicuous absence of any attempts to challenge the reasons for and the legitimacy of counterplan strategies. While various theories about counterplans have been challenged, modified, accepted, and discarded, the utility and appropriateness of counterplans themselves for debate has been accepted a priori by almost all of the participants. Recently, some debaters and coaches have begun to come out of the closet with respect to their views regarding the legitimacy of counterplans. This article is an attempt to arouse discussion in this area, and hopefully, provide intellectual ammunition for a new perspective on the role both teams play in analyzing policy proposals.

Why Counterplans?

In one sense, counterplans are the logical descendent of the progression of affirmative and negative strategies designed to advance the analysis of the resolution under dispute. The question posed by any resolution is and always has been : should this policy direction be pursued? In fact, the term "should" is the pivotal term in any resolution. While the actors and actions of the topic change year, the decision-making is always guided by reference to the term "should". Not "can" the resolution be affirmed; not "will" it, "might" it, "must" it, or "has" it. In deciding a debate, the judge always must decide whether or not the affirmative proposal "should" be done. If so, the judge votes affirmative; if not, he or she votes negative. In this light, most of the argumentative tools of debate can be viewed as merely different ways of addressing the desirability of (should we affirm or reject?) resolutional action. Years ago, the affirmative advocated the entire resolution, and the negative argued against the entire resolution. Gradually, it was decided that by selecting a particular example of the topic, and debating its merits, the broader question could be decided, essentially by proxy. Other strategies evolved in the same way: alternative justification, a way for the affirmative to present multiple examples of the topic; justification, the argument that the example offered by the affirmative doesn't warrant the conclusions offered by the resolution; topicality (in all varieties), when the affirmative example is wholly unrelated to the topic; counter-warrants and hasty generalizations, which argue that the affirmative example is atypical or unrepresentative of the resolution. Despite the merits of these particular strategies, there is a clear nexus of purpose: they are all designed as tools for debating the resolution more effectively. Placed in this context, the raison d'etre for counterplans is obvious. They were conceived as an attempt to contest the desirability of the resolution (as represented by the affirmative) by offering alternate course of action that would be more desirable. Essentially, a counterplan posits that the resolutional action SHOULD NOT be undertaken by arguing that other actions SHOULD. A counterplan, then, is merely another vehicle for the negative attempt to debate the term "should'.

Optimality or Marginality?

Clearly, all negative strategies derive, in one form or another, to satisfy the fundamental requirement of the negative: to prove that change is undesirable. To ensure that these negative strategies are responsive and relevant, though, there must be clarity regarding the nature of the term "should'. Does a negative counterplan refute the affirmative claim that the resolution "should" be adopted? What exactly is the affirmative supporting when they say we "should" do something? Essentially, there are two competing interpretations of the term "should". One school of thought (the prevailing one in the debate community) argues that "should" means "as opposed to all conceivable alternatives". These alternatives are represented, of course, by the counterplan(s) the negative presents. If the negative can show that any of these competitive alternatives are superior to the affirmative, they have proven that resolutional action should not be mandated. Thus, to prove we should do something, the affirmative must win that, vis a vis the affirmative, all competing courses of action should NOT be enacted. This view we will label as the optimality perspective. The affirmative must be proven the optimal policy choice, compared to all other alternatives the negative may offer.

At first glance, there appears to be nothing unusual about this notion of optimality. After even a short stint as a debater, this way of comparing policy choices becomes engrained. However, this definition of "should" is not the only available. In fact, the concept of "should" as it has evolved in debate is quite an anomaly; one would be hard pressed to find many examples of the use of the optimality concept in any other field, situation, or context. The interpretation of "should" I will defend in this article will be referred to as the marginality perspective. By marginality, I mean "should" implies "as compared to the way things are being done now". This approach tests the resolution against the status quo: Is the affirmative on balance superior to the present system? The affirmative must still be desirable, but only marginally so (versus the status quo) rather than optimally so (versus all conceivable alternatives, status quo included).

Marginality in Practice

The notion of "as compared to the way things are done now" is nothing novel. Such a comparison is implicit any time the term "should" is invoked. Examples will make this clear. Imagine a congressperson proposing a mandatory seat belt law. The floor is opened to debate over the merits of mandating safety belts. All of a sudden, another member of Congress interrupts with the brilliant idea of banning all automobiles. Such a suggestion would be immediately discarded as irrelevant (if not also as absurd). Obviously, when the first member of congress proposed the seat belt law, he or she presupposed the existence of cars in the first place. The bill was suggested in a world where automobiles (and automobile accidents) were the quid pro quo. Similarly, take the example of a group of friends discussing where to dine. After a list of several restaurants, someone suggests that the group play tiddly-winks instead. While that might make for great group fun, playing tiddly-winks has absolutely nothing to do with the process of selecting WHERE to have dinner. The tiddly-winks suggestion should have been offered in the "What should we do tonight?" or the "Should we even have dinner?" conversations. Once the topic under discussion is clearly not whether to eat but where to do it, the "counterplan" offered by the tiddly-wink enthusiast begs the question being asked.

These analogies highlight the fundamental flaw in the optimality perspective. Counterplans are not responsive to the question posed by the resolution. The resolution suggests an action, and asks if it should be done. It explicitly limits the range of discussion to that action and no more: should we affirm this resolution? Yes or no? The area under discussion is the resolution and its beneficial and detrimental effects, nothing more. When the negative counterplans, it begs the question of the topic. Resolutions do not make claims such as, "Resolved: the United States should enact ___________________ as compared to all other competing priorities." Such wording might legitimize counterplans, implicitly, by requiring the affirmative to be superior to all other options, although even then it is arguable that the affirmative need only be superior to extant alternatives. It is not a coincidence that the resolution is worded in its present fashion. It proposes a course of action. It is up to both sides to clash over that particular action, not distract the question at hand with unrelated policies.

An example of a popular generic counterplan will further illustrate my point. Recent college and high school topics have dealt with uniform, minimum educational standards imposed by the Federal government. The thrust of this topic, and the reason that Federal intrusion into the area of education was ever suggested, is that for the past 200+ years, the states' performance in education has been unsatisfactory. Time and again, the states have been unwilling to force the schools under their control to meet minimum standards. The affirmative's rationale for Federal action is largely buttressed by the demonstrated recalcitrance of the states to take the initiative. Without fail, the negative would counterplan by doing exactly what the affirmative did, but enacting the proposal simultaneously in the 50 states. Such a strategy begs the question posed by the topic. The topic demands that the desirability of federal action be debated; the negative proposal to go through the states relegates the central question of the resolution to secondary importance. Indeed, at the start of the debate, the affirmative, in arguing for change advances its best possible indictment of the status quo as it exists at the start of the first affirmative constructive. In arguing for change, what other system could the affirmative claim to be superior to? The status quo is all that exists when the debate commences. The affirmative cannot forsee all possible systems that the negative could offer; and even if such premonition were possible, the negative could always change its strategy, since the affirmative must speak first. In short, when the affirmative argues that we should change, they mean that change is beneficial as compared to the present system; there exists no other standard of comparison to which they could conceivably be appealing, The origin of the idea that the affirmative must compare favorably to any and all negative proposals, is beyond me. Surely the affirmative has done their job if they can prove change is warranted at the margin.

Negative Fiat

As most students of debate know, debate has adopted a curious deus ex machina to make debate more practical. The concept of fiat (from Latin, literally meaning, "Let it be") is the assumption, for the purpose of discussion, that the resolution can be implemented. Obviously, four debaters in a classroom aren't really able to affect the nation's policies. But debate would be inane if the affirmative offered the plan in the 1AC, and then the 1NC rose and cavalierly argued, "Since the affirmative team members are not congresspersons, they cannot put their plan into effect. Therefore, the negative wins." Thus, to avoid questions of whether or not the present system would adopt the affirmative, we assume that it would, for the purpose of discussion. This makes it possible to debate the merits of proposals, rather than the likelihood of their adoption. So far, so good. We have made only one assumption: that the action specified in the topic is put into effect, so that its desirability can be evaluated. Notice that the rationale for allowing this is, once again, to focus more clearly on whether we "should" affirm the topic. This brings us to an important question: Where does "negative fiat", if such a thing is possible, come from? Why does the negative have the right to offer and implement proposals? Observe that fiat, as developed above, is not known as "affirmative" fiat; it is neutral with respect to side. It is a device that assists BOTH teams in analyzing whether we should take action. Fiat merely directs the debate more clearly to relevant discussion. Fiat is not a reciprocal privilege that the negative deserves on grounds of equity, because it doesn't give either side an advantage over the other. Fiat inheres in the way both teams debate the merits of the resolution. In essence, the negative already has "benefited" from fiating the resolution into existence as much as the affirmative did; both sides now can avoid debating what WOULD be done and debate instead what SHOULD be done.

Consequently, the conclusion that the negative deserves "negative fiat" to counter the "affirmative fiat" is groundless. Thus, the prior question, posed again: why and how can the negative assume into existence alternative
policies? There is only one action asked to be debated: the resolution (or its designated representative, the plan) . We can assume into existence the resolution and nothing more. From our standpoint, that is literally all that we have control over; we have, by agreeing to limit discussion to a single proposal, proscribed our ability to deal with or effectuate any other policies. Succinctly stated, there is no theoretical basis for the existence of counterplans as an argument against the affirmative.

Whither the negative?

At the outset of this section, let me make clear my conviction that this part of the essay is not indispensable to my argument in any way. The preceding paragraphs are reasons why counterplans have no legitimacy as debate arguments. If that is indeed true, then arguments about what debate will come to after the passing of counterplans, is secondary. Remember, at one time there was no such thing as a counterplan. Debate persevered. There is
absolutely nothing wrong with innovation in debate; however, those who innovate must be able to justify the appropriateness of their creations. If counterplans are proven inappropriate for debate, they should be discarded. The fact that they have been around for so long should afford them no special protection.

For the sake of argument (no pun intended), though, what would the post-counterplan world look like? Not that different, really. The negative would defend the status quo. The affirmative, to win, would have to be on balance superior to the way things are done in the present system. It is beyond me why so many people are unwilling to force the negative to defend the present system. A typical claim is, "It's unfair to leave the negative nothing but the messed-up, defunct status quo. Why should the negative get stuck with it?" What a facile assertion! The status quo is not some random, irrational system that is inherently deficient. There are reaons why things are done the way they currently are. True, they may be bad or flimsy reasons, but in those instances, then change would seem to indeed be warranted. And should we not have equal, if not greater, sympathy for the affirmative? They are asked to prove that the longstanding traditions of the status quo be abandoned in favor of an untried alternative. my point is that there is nothing untenable about the negative arguing that we should not change the status quo.

Argumentative Benefits

Another equally unpersuasive claim is that "valuable" issues will be eliminated if counterplans perish. This is, of course, untrue. Counterplans are merely disadvantages that aren't really unique. There is a link to the affirmative (the competitiveness) and an impact (the counterplan advantage). All really that is missing is the uniqueness. Without the negative counterplanning, the advantage of the counterplan would never be realized (the disad wouldn't be unique) . The system that the affirmative interrupts, undermines, or competes with has no propensity to operate successfully on its own.

Take for example the socialism counterplan. Negatives fiat into existence a democratic socialist government and claim that the action of the affirmative hampers the effectiveness of this revolutionary government. Such a meritorious argument would not be banished without the counterplan. Rather, the negative would instead of fiating socialism into existence, have to show that, absent the interruption of the affirmative, socialism would establish itself in the status quo. If that can't be shown, the disadvantage is not unique to the affirmative, since the status quo can't produce effective socialism, regardless of the affirmative.

"Valuable" arguments, then, wouldn't be sacrificed; only those that were not truly reasons to reject the affirmative (i.e., non-unique disadvantages). The elimination of counterplans would improve, not harm, the quality of argumentation by placing a higher burden of proof on the issues in the debate. The successful negative would be the one who argued extremely well researched disadvantages, had a copious quantity of specific case evidence, and who was competent at extending intelligent topicality violations. Few debate purists would object to such strategies.

Prospects for Change

As noted at the outset of this article, attacks on the legitimacy of counterplans are only recently gaining currency. However, the view that counterplans may be inappropriate for debating questions of policy is not just the view of some theoretical Neanderthals; the basis of these objections rests squarely upon the fundamental assumptions about the role of both sides in debate. As such, this perspective holds greater hope for success than many of the traditional theoretical objections which are based on subjective criteria such as 'Time constraints', and other such whines. While the strong competitive tendencies of debate may raise vociferous objections to the extinction of counterplans, it is only by forcing counterplans enthusiasts to defend the rationales for counterplans that any in-roads are possible. Those who resist the loudest should be reminded of the garbled sounds of the Kentucky Round Robin (with apologies to the Rolling Stones) : "You can't always get what you want but sometimes, you get what you need"