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On Dallas On Competition
Jonathan Massey, Harvard 1985
- Clarifying Water Policy |
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Questions raised by the idea of counterplan competition (what it means, how it can be established, its relationship to other issues in debate, and so on) concern an increasing number of debaters and theorists (two groups that often seem mutually exclusive). The many possibilities for counterplans on the upcoming water pollution topic (non-comprehensive or sub-national policies, or alternatives which solve peripheral affirmative advantages without protecting water quality) makes the issue of "competitiveness" even more salient. While counterplans for the most part enjoy widespread use in contemporary academic debate, a few particularly outspoken theorists have questioned the bases of their legitimacy. I begin by examining several objections to the idea of counterplans (many of which relate to competitiveness) and then use this example to make some general observations on the nature of the process by which debate theory is formulated (which I term "meta-theory"). Dallas Perkins, coach of debating at Harvard, levels a number of criticisms to the counterplan.1 Real world policy makers, notes Commander Dallas, "are not interested in utopian rhetoric."2 Congressmen and women were not persuaded to vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by the argument that "the states could do it better." The states had failed for a century to secure equality for blacks and other minorities, and the chances that they would act responsibly in the 1960s, especially in the South, were close to zero. Similarly, if a particular counterplan is inherently unlikely, then its desirability and competitiveness need not be considered by a judge. Dallas proposes an "incremental" definition of should, "better than any equally or more likely alternative."3 He contrasts this wit@ an interpretation of should that implies optimality, i.e. that the action or state of affairs under discussion is the very best response to a given problem or issue. Proof that "Y" is an optimal solution cannot invalidate the claim that "X" is an incrementally better policy than the present system. Dallas considers two statements:
In the former, "should" means that going to the movies is preferable to our normal Friday activities; "should" in the second sentence means that the army is better than a wide range of possible alternatives. It is in some sense "optimal.' Viewed in this ordinary way, it is easy to see how both statements must he affirmed, despite their ostensible incompatibility.4 This objection raises the issue of competitiveness in various guises. This ought not be surprising, for competition is much more than the second observation blurted out by the first negative speaker when s/he initially presents the counterplan. Competition defines the essence of the counterplan. It explains how the counterplan justifies the rejection of the affirmative, i.e. why the affirmative proposal is a bad idea. The twin definitions of "should" generate two ideas of competitiveness. If the affirmative must prove that its proposal is merely incrementally better than the status quo (e.g. Friday's usual activities or the states' typical civil rights policies), then the role of counterplans is greatly reduced, perhaps eliminated altogether. If, on the other hand, the affirmative must demonstrate that its proposal is optimal (i.e. the best of all possible solutions), then the legitimate role of counterplans is much broader. All debate concepts are interrelated. Central to this discussion here, for example, is the often obscured idea of fiat. The chief insight into fiat, the distinction between "is' and "ought," was grasped by David Hume over two hundred years ago. Parenthetically, it is disheartening to observe that this lesson has apparently not been learned by many of today's debaters (e.g. negative teams who expect to win rounds by roving that the present system will as opposed to should not--adopt the resolution and affirmatives who attempt to show inherency by indicating that the federal government will not--as opposed to should--pass the plan). Fiat describes what kind of arguments the judge is allowed to consider in making his or her decision. The judge determines the optimal mix of policy options presented in the debate round on the basis of the evidence read and arguments made by the teams. If this optimal mix of policy options implies the truth of the resolution (i.e. it the optimal policy mix contains topical provisions) the judge votes affirmative; if not, he or she votes negative. Fiat defines what it means to 'imply the truth of the resolution." If should is interpreted as merely "better than the status quo," then the burden on the affirmative is much less than if should is taken to imply optimality. There may also be exogenously imposed constraints on fiat not logically derivable from the meaning of the word "should," For example, many debaters and judges restrict the range of proposed policy options to governmental actions rather than allowing teams to advocate changes in the behavior of individuals. There appears no rational reason for this restriction; we could obviously discuss what individuals ought to do (indeed, much of philosophy is devoted to this end). In Hume's language, this is a matter of convention and preference (,e.g. concerns about "debatability"). In practical terms, what do these ruminations mean? How can debaters exploit the dual meaning of should and its implications for fiat and competitiveness? First, teams can insist that their opponents adopt practices that are internally consistent. For example, negative teams which run counterplans (which imply that they construe "should." as "optimal") must concede the need for disadvantages to be "intrinsic to the resolution." The same reasoning lies behind counterplans and plan repairs to defeat disadvantages. Competitive counterplans function as disadvantages; they demonstrate that the affirmative proposal is a bad idea because it prevents the achievement of other, more compelling advantages. Based on our definitions of fiat and what it means to be competitive, however, this can only be demonstrated if so-called "permutations" between the plan and counterplan are analyzed. For example, consider a resolution on energy policy. The affirmative advocates a tariff restricting oil imports; the negative counterplans with increased oil imports and increased food aid to the Third world. Food aid is germane or competitive. It does the rejection of the affirmative permutation of an oil tariff and aid is the optimal policy mix as arguments in the round, then the vote affirmative. (For a good discussion of permutation theory, see Tim Sander's article on this subject in last year's Debater's Research Guide.) The real dispute on this issue is generated by proposed permutations that involve ideas not explicit in either the affirmative plan or the counterplan. In our energy policy example, suppose the negative had merely argued that increased oil imports would (for some strange reason) solve world hunger. Can the affirmative propose increased food aid as an alternate way to ameliorate hunger which, when combined with an oil tariff, constitutes the optimal policy mix? The answer to this question, I think, must be yes. The same logic which enables the affirmative to Permute its plan and the counterplan allows it to advocate new options in response to the counterplan hitherto unproposed by either team. Both strategies rely on a definition of competitiveness that rejection of the affirmative proposal must be a necessary condition for the attainment of the counterplan advantages. There is no reason why the counterplan is any more competitive if, by proposing a new policy action, the affirmative can obviate the need for the counterplan. In such circumstances, the existence of the permutation demonstrates that what the counterplan really justifies is the adoption of additional Policies, not the rejection of the affirmative. Also, I am skeptical that a distinction between Pure" permutations derived solely from a mixture of the plan and the counterplan and "new" permutations involving additional policies proposed by the affirmative could be made in practice. Consider a typical world government Counterplan. Its advocates often claim that by abolishing the external sovereignty of nation states, the counterplan reduces the incidence of war. Could the affirmative propose disarmament as a permutation? Some may consider this a "new" idea, but surely the concept of the surrender of the control over defense policy by individual nation-states is implicit in the counterplan. For example, suppose the world government counterplan claimed that by dismantling the US government, it prevented the deployment of the MX (oh, excuse me, the "Peacekeeper") missile. In this instance, the affirmative seems clearly justified in arguing that MX cancellation is implicit in the counterplan and hence that the permutation of MX ban and adoption of the affirmative is a legitimate policy mix. In short, I believe that the distinction between "pure" and "new" permutations is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain, as well as logically irrelevant. Note that much of the reasoning above justifies the requirement that disadvantages be intrinsic to the resolution. Again, if we are searching for optimality, why must the affirmative wait for the negative to counterplan before it introduces new policy options that solve the harms isolated by the negative? This argument becomes clearer when we realize that our interpretation of competitiveness essentially means that counterplans function as disadvantages. If affirmatives can suggest permutations to disadvantages in the guise of counterplans, why can't they suggest repairs to disadvantages outright?- I can't think of any logical reason, only matters of preference and convention (e.g. Dallas' dislike of plan repairs that "muck up the debate" or "make for bad debates"). Parenthetically, the introduction of "intrinsic to the resolution" answers does not mean that disadvantages disappear from debate, as an exchange between Bill Brewster and Michael Mankins in last year's Debater's Research Guide conclusively showed. Affirmatives need evidence for repairs whose efficacy and desirability are not immediately apparent. Negative teams can challenge the proposed repairs on their merits. If the negative counterplans, then, it must concede the affirmative the right to require that disadvantages be intrinsic to the resolution. Note that the converse is not true; if the negative does not counterplan, it cannot invalidate plan repairs on this basis. The affirmative can always maintain that it was interpreting should as "optimality" all along and that the negative team could have counterplanned had it chosen to do so. We are left with two internally consistent models of counterplan/competition/fiat interaction, as defined by the twin definitions of the word "should." How can we (especially debaters competing in rounds) choose between them? Dallas, citing convention, assigns the affirmative the right to choose. According to his interpretation, counterplans must be at least as likely as the affirmative to warrant consideration by the judge. This compromise, I believe, is unsatisfactory because neither definition of should implies anything about the likelihood of the adoption of the counterplan. Either should connotes "better than," in which case there are no counterplans, or it means "optimality," in which case there are unlimited counterplans. Instead, I suggest that the choice between the two interpretations of "should" is made by the judge on the basis of his or her subjective preferences. Zarefsky argues that the choice between the internally consistent paradigms of policy making and hypothesis testing must be made on the basis of (in Hume's terms) preferences, not reason. Certainly, debaters can attempt to persuade the judge that particular interpretations are superior because 1) they more accurately match preferences the judge already has or 2) the judge ought to change his or her current preferences and adopt those of the debaters. The process of decision-making need not be conservative. Indeed, I believe that it is dynamic and dialectical, a process of constant re-examination and comparison of principles (debate theory) and considered convictions (intuitive ideas about the debate process as influenced by experience and prevailing views of the community). Zac Grant has noted the similarity of such a process to the notion of "reflective equilibrium" as developed by John Rawls.6 I believe that much of what passes for debate theorizing is discussion about external preferences rather than logical reasoning. Robin Rowland's judging philosophy is a good example of this. Some may feel that debate theory is weakened by an admission that many choices within it are made on the basis of preference rather than rigorous, "objective" logic. I think that, if anything, the opposite is true (turnaround!). Pretending that it is possible to resolve questions of theory without introducing questions of values and subjective assumptions will only create further disagreements. Eventually, everyone will see that the emperor has no clothes. Furthermore, as Friedrich Nietzsche recognized, a view based on preference and values is not inferior to one premised on "reason," As debaters more than anyone else ought to recognize, the realm of preferences is the realm of rhetoric and persuasion. NOTES
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