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Limits - The Essence of Topicality
Eric Kupferbreg, University of Kentucky 1987 - Latin
American Politics: The Calculus of Instability |
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THE PROBLEM The past several years have witnessed two distinct trends in topicality debates. The first concerns a growing preoccupation with topicality standards. The second is the inability to resolve most of the ever increasingly intricate linguistical disputes. It is my firm conviction that there is a strong causal connection between the two trends. CONVENTIONAL TOPICALITY STANDARDS--OR HOW TO WALLOW IN THE MIRE Most articles on topicality devote their attention to the two dominant schools of topicality standards reasonability and best definition. Debaters have dutifully compiled long lists of reasons in support of one or the other or both outlooks. However, such analysis inevitably suffers from two pitfalls. First, the shortcomings debaters invent usually are mutually applicable to either standard (e. g., both reasonability and best definition standards are highly subjective and prone to judge intervention). And, second, neither standard can be easily defined with precision. More often than not, debaters make impassioned pleas for what is 'best" or reasonable without providing adequate guidelines to determine what completely constitutes either standard. Neither school offers any compelling criteria by which to judge whether the larger 'standard" has been met. JUDGE BACKLASH The trend toward junky topicality standards has produced many interesting-though damaging--reactions among the judging community. Most of the reactions fall under one of the following categories.
Any one of these three reactions are disastrous for quality topicality debates. Questions of resolutionality serve an important function in argumentative disputes. However, the adverse reactions described in the previous paragraphs are clear examples of 'throwing out the baby with the bathwater. "LIMITS": A PARTIAL SOLUTION DEBATE AS ITS OWE CONTEXT It is widely held in linguistics and shared by the debate community, that a single word can have multiple meanings depending on the context in which it is used. The emergence of the "field contextual" standard for definitions recognizes this belief. However, I feel that most pleas for "contextual' definitions are misplaced. Importantly, words differ in their meanings because they are used for different purposes. 'Cold Turkey' for a Jerry's Sub Shop worker clearly conveys a different message than it might for a drug addict. The 'field context" standard suggests that we should prefer definitions taken from the field identified within the resolutional subject area. For example, during last year, an agricultural definition of 'long-term' was preferred over a legal interpretation. My contention is that participants in this activity have forgotten that they are in the context of inter-scholastic, competitive debate--though we often pretend otherwise. What might be appropriate within the subject matter field may not serve the salient interests of the debate context. A definition that produces an uneducational or unfair resolution is neither 'reasonable' nor 'best." An expert in agricultural policies does operate with the same constraints as those placed on a debater. There are, for example, no time limits for speeches, constraints on research resources or competitive incentives to define someone out of the room. Often, field contextual definitions are too broad or too narrow for debate purposes. Definitions derived from the agricultural sector necessarily incorporated financial and bureaucratic factors which are less relevant in considering a 'should' proposition. Often subject experts' definitions reflected administrative or political motives to expand or limit the relevant jurisdiction of certain actors. Moreover, field context is an insufficient criteria for choosing between competing definitions. A particularly broad field might have several subsets that invite restrictive and even exclusive definitions. (e.g., What is considered 'long-term' for the swine farmer might be significantly different than for the grain farmer.) Why would debaters accept definitions that are inappropriate for debate? If we admit that debate is a unique context, then additional considerations enter into our definitional analysis. "LIMITS" AS A HELPING CRITERIA If one considers the purpose of topicality--to initiate a meaningful discussion with sufficient prior notice and adequate ground for both sides--then the questions of delimitation become the focus of topicality standards. Both 'reasonability' and 'best definition' claim to enhance the debate process--the former by providing adequate ground for affirmative case areas and the latter by preventing an unreasonable run-a-way topic. I am not suggesting that limits should be the only test for topicality. If this were sole criteria, teams could argue that inherently limited topics are superior, hence, negatives win because their definition excludes the affirmative (there's always a competitive incentive to limit the affirmative out of the round). Obviously, limits for limits sake is arbitrary as well as abusive. However, debatable limits are clearly desirable. What are these 'debatable limits'? Here are some relevant questions that if answered carefully might help to create criteria for debatable limits:
HOW TO USE THE "LIMITS" STANDARD First, it should be mentioned that the "breadth/depth" debate is an exercise in futility. Almost everyone would agree that a topic should allow for breadth when discussing issues as well as depth of analysis. It is only when topics become (1) overly broad that they are uneducational and (2) so narrow that they become boring. So . . . what's the strategy. If you are negative, two lines of argumentation should be advanced. First, it is necessary to explain that the affirmative interpretation unlimits the resolution. It should be explained that many cases normally thought to be outside of the resolution would become topical. Special emphasis should be placed on explaining why the affirmative definition would serve as a precedent to an undebatable topic. A premium should be placed on pointing out absurd examples that would be allowable under the broader interpretation (or, the sheer number of cases that would fall within the resolution). Second, it is the negatives responsibility to explain that their own interpretation would allow for an adequate number of cases. If the negative is able to list several fruitful case areas that would remain topical, then the negative position appears less abusive. For the affirmative, the strategy would be the converse. First, the affirmative would suggest that their interpretation still excludes many abusive case areas. They would advance reasons why a somewhat broader definition still provides clear limits to the resolution. Second, the affirmative would be inclined to list many commonly run cases that would be excluded under the negative interpretation. The affirmative's examples should point towards proving the negative definitions as overlimiting while noting the remaining limits of the affirmative. CONCLUSION--OR A LESSON IN THE OBVIOUS The use of "limits" as a standard is a necessary, but not sufficient criteria for evaluating topicality. Often, topics intrinsically lend themselves to overly broad or narrow interpretations. A more likely possibility is the inability to find a combination of definitions that both allows for a debatable number of cases and provides some limits to the topic. The 'limits' standard does, however, address the goal to topicality arguments. It allows debaters and judges alike the opportunity to ask, 'Is this interpretation advantageous or disadvantageous for debate?. Rather than wallowing in the mire of "reasonability" and "best definition" standards, we should simply address the impact that a certain interpretation might have on the topic. If this approach is adopted, the judge backlash might be reversed. |