Derek Jinks, University of Texas, Austin

1993 - Health Care Policy: Debating Coverage Cures

Any discussion of critique arguments must devote considerable attention to the definition of terms. In this article, I want to focus on the defining characteristics of the critique. That is, characteristics which distinguish the critique from disadvantages, counterplans, or other negative arguments. Ultimately, critiques are theoretically unsound, although I feel that the argument does provide fertile ground for some interesting debates.

Critiques attempt to invalidate the affirmative case by undermining one or more of its fundamental assumptions. This, in and of itself, is not a new idea. Disadvantages undermine the assumption that the affirmative plan is a good idea, counterplans undermine the assumption that the plan is the best way to solve the problem, etc. Critique arguments take a unique approach in that they need not: (1) demonstrate a unique link or impact; (2) advocate an alternative (whether it be the status quo or a counterplan); (3) have impacts which outweigh the case in the traditional sense. Each of these components needs further explanation, but examples will help clarify these issues first.

Critiques: A Typology

Broadly categorized, there are three types of critiques which have been argued. First are critiques of the system of thought employed by the. For instance, the negative may critique the notion of rationality. The negative would claim that the affirmative case is built upon the assumption that rationality is a viable system of thought and that this assumption is flawed; hence, the affirmative case is rejected since it is built upon a flawed assumption. Critiques of language are the second type. These critiques challenge the appropriateness of some aspect of the affirmative's language. For example, the affirmative may claim that the use of sexist, racist or other unsavory language justifies voting against the affirmative. The third type is the "ethical imperative" critique. Such critiques claim the affirmative, on face, violates an ethical imperative. For example, the negative may claim that the affirmative plan involves governmental action and that such action is unethical. Since the initial action of the plan is illegitimate, the plan is rejected. Each of these types has different implications for debate and assumptions about the nature of debate. Thus, each must be evaluated separately.

"Systems of Thought," Critiques

As stated earlier, these critiques attempt to undermine the validity of one or more assumptions made by the affirmative. At first glance, every topic and/or plan makes countless assumptions. Potential critiques include (but clearly are not limited to): the viability of rationality, causality, historical explanations, ethical claims, and so on. Any claim can be questioned on any number of levels. However, in any debate both sides must ultimately engage each other at some level. The critique alters the level at which argumentative clash occurs. Clearly, there is the possibility of infinite regression should the affirmative launch a counter critique which would, in turn, be susceptible to a critique, and so on. Rebuttals could hardly check such a progression since all the critiques/counter-critiques would be responsive to arguments made in the previous speech, and thus, not new.

The focus of the debate can fundamentally shift from one level of inquiry to another in each speech. Perhaps a better way to conceptualize the affirmative burden is to view the plan as an "if-then" proposition. If the assumptions implicit in the policy framework of the resolution are true, then the affirmative plan is a good idea. The level of engagement which seems most appropriate is implied in the topic wording. Such an approach is evident in the respective discursive fields. Much of the health care literature discusses policy options without legitimizing all of the implicit philosophical assumptions of its approach. Discourses proceed from a set of assumptions which are taken to be true. Doctors act to save patients' lives without contemplating the value of life and/or the ethical implications of their actions. In order for discussion to diversify into various fields of inquiry, certain assumptions must be taken as true. The policy literature on any topic is rich enough to provide a broad range of options for both the affirmative and the negative. Specifically, there is a broad range of literature on U.S. health care policy proper. In what way is the negative disadvantaged by the elimination of systemic critiques?

The sheer number of possible critiques creates many problems for affirmatives. If critiques are taken as theoretically acceptable and, thereby, affirmatives are forced to answer each critique on its own terms, then the research burden for the affirmative is substantially increased. The impact that such arguments have on the division of ground seems vitally important. Theoretical positions are often repudiated based solely on the fact that those arguments disproportionately favor one side or the other. For instance, counterwarrants and so-called justification arguments both were rejected by the community because of the adverse

impact these strategies had on the debate process. Indeed, the competitive balance in debate is precarious. Perhaps our activity can ill-afford to increase substantially the level of preparation required to compete nationally, at a time when interest in debate is on less than solid ground. If it is unreasonable to expect affirmatives to cope with counterwarrants due to ground concerns, then it is unreasonable to expect affirmatives to be able to toe the line on any and all philosophical questions implicated by the resolution.

Addressing systemic critiques on their own terms, other problems can be discerned. In seeking to invalidate the systemic assumptions of the affirmative, negatives must either employ the same system of thought as the affirmative or an alternative system. On the other hand, critiques may employ an alternative system of thought to invalidate the system used by the affirmative. T'his approach, however, can not hope to discredit the affirmative approach. One system of thought cannot critique another while remaining completely separate from it. If two worldviews remain autonomous, critique is not possible. Through critiques, a system may only be shown to be unfaithful to its own principles. However, the various principles which are favored by each system are resistant to external critiques.

If the negative critique operates within the same system of thought which is being critiqued, then the critique is self defeating. For example, if the negative uses rational arguments to disprove the viability of rationality, then the negative claim is itself invalid. Note, the claim here is not that the negative critique is also invalid, rather the claim is that the argument can not be an offensive force in the debate at all since its claim is self-defeating. Proponents of these critiques may claim that the self-defeating character of the argument proves its point. However, this critique proves its point at the expense of its potential impact in the debate. On what grounds would the judge justify her decision? The rational argument made by the negative cannot be accepted. The best the negative can hope for is that the critique creates a vortex which sucks in the affirmative as well as the critique itself. The negative can then claim that the affirmative has failed in its burden to "affirm" the resolution, hence the negative wins (or, more accurately, the affirmative loses). But, on what grounds can such a claim be made? It is a particular sort of reasoning that prescribes such a response by a judge. If the critique offered in the debate invalidates any one of the implicit assumptions made by the judge in the voting process, then the critique has no impact in the debate. Proponents of the critique may map out well reasoned theoretical arguments as to why systemic critiques disprove the affirmative case. However, these theoretical constructs employ the very systems of thought which are the object of criticism. The questions raised by such critiques are important, but can (or should) these questions be posed in academic debate? Critiques can develop the self-critique of its object, but it cannot prescribe action based on the repudiated framework.

"'Language" Critiques

Many critiques do not attempt to reveal any internal contradictions; rather they make explicitly political judgments about the acceptability of the affirmative language. These critiques are strikingly similar to the "punishment" arguments of yesteryear, and share many of the same flaws.

These critiques take a unique form. For instance, the negative may claim that using the rhetoric of poverty is dehumanizing and discriminatory. Any affirmative which immerses itself within the rhetoric of poverty (even, and perhaps especially, if the plan targets the poor as the beneficiary of its plan) dehumanizes the poor through their speech acts. The negative contends that the debate itself is being conducted in such a way as to discriminate against the poor. Such a critique, it is claimed, outweighs all other considerations in the debate since the "impacts" emanate from the debate. This requires a little explaining. No affirmative advantage could possibly outweigh the critique since all affirmative advantages are merely utopian constructs. If a judge votes for a plan which universalizes health care, none of the proposed benefits to such action will actually be realized. The judge has no actual control over U.S. health care policy. The impacts to the critique, however, are grounded in the conduct of the debate. If the judge votes against the affirmative a wrong will have been righted, or so the argument goes.

Several objections can be raised to this line of reasoning. Once again, these critiques are many in number. Some possible objects of critique include: language which is not gender neutral; language which is gender neutral; the rhetoric of progress; the rhetoric of reform; classist language; language which implies a distinction between (wo)man and nature; hierarchical language (for instance, language which refers to some countries as "third world" or "lesser-developed" countries); the use of written language; and so on. These critiques can clearly be taken to unacceptable extremes. An affirmative can clearly be put into a tough spot. Such critiques may even be extended into the rhetoric used by the authors quoted by the affirmative.

When levying these critiques, negatives often assume that the affirmative is using the criticized language in a way that is objectionable. If the affirmative does not intend for their language to demean others, does the critique still apply? The negative may claim that the intent is irrelevant since the words themselves are offensive and/or unacceptable. If so, on what grounds should the affirmative lose the debate? If the affirmative has no agency in that the words they use operate independently of their intended purpose, then the affirmative is not culpable. Also, the critique turns on the negative when this argument is made. If the words themselves are demeaning regardless of the intent of the speaker, the negative is guilty of using the same rhetoric in the exercise of their critique. Perhaps the negative is more culpable since they labeled the affirmative as racist, sexist, classist or something equally distasteful in the name of winning a debate. After all, why is it that unfounded evidence challenges are met with no small measure of scorn?

Finally, impact comparisons are oversimplified by the critique. How should impacts be compared if the critique debate is close? Although the critique claims an a priori impact, it is fundamentally different from other arguments that make the same claim. In a close topicality debate, the judge must decide who wins topicality before evaluating the balance of the debate. If the affirmative is found nontopical they lose, even if the negative narrowly carries the argument. Language critiques seem quite different. The negative must demonstrate that the affirmative language is sufficiently villainous to warrant a negative ballot. Doubts favor the affirmative. There is a threshold of certainty which must be crossed in these debates for the judge to vote for the critique. This seems to strip language critiques of a "critique" status since the argument is transformed into something which resembles a disadvantage. The degree to which many judges evaluate even topicality on the same grounds demonstrates the community's wise reluctance to allow the argumentative burdens of a priori arguments to be watered down. "Language" critiques seem to be a step in the wrong direction.

Also, the affirmative case impacts should weigh in the judge's decision calculus. Although fiat is utopian (no action actually takes place with an affirmative vote), the utility of affirming the values defended in the affirmative case seems no less valuable than the utility of negating the values embedded in their language. If the judge's ballot is to be seen as an instrument of social change, then the judge must weigh the benefits to be gained from affirming the idea of universal health care against the benefits to be gained from repudiating the language used in the debate.

"Ethical imperative" Critiques

"Language" critiques are a subset of this type and much of much of the Previous section applies equally well here. However, a few critical concepts can be discussed on in reference to these critiques. In making an "ethical imperative" critique, the negative may claim that the affirmative works within an unjust system. The example mentioned earlier of a critique of governmental action is instructive. The negative would claim that governmental action is coercive and, hence, should be rejected on face. Now, an interesting twist comes to the surface. The negative further claims that they need not advocate an alternative to governmental action. Concerning this issue of specifying an alternative, the negative claims that they need only prove that the affirmative should be rejected, not that some alternative would be better. The negative here need not defend any alternative including the status quo. However, this position is problematic. First, the resolution is structured in such that affirmatives organize themselves in opposition to the status quo. Can the plan be evaluated outside of comparisons to the status quo (or a counterplan)? Second, the critique can not prescribe action without specifying an alternative. Critiques can demonstrate flaws in the affirmative reasoning without specifying an alternative, but the negative cannot prescribe that the plan be rejected without reference to an alternative. Can the judge evaluate any proposal without knowing what the world without the plan would look like? The claim that the critique can operate effectively without reference to alternatives fails to recognize one distinct possibility: there may be no perfect answer; we may need to choose the lesser of two or more evils. A deeply flawed plan may be the best course of action.

These critiques promise to resurrect some arguments that had run their course as counterplans or disadvantages. Socialism reemerges as the critique of capitalism; world government surfaces as the critique of the nation-state; anarchy returns as the critique of government, and so on. However, the affirmative will be particularly disadvantaged in their attempts to answer these arguments. Uniqueness arguments are irrelevant since the plan is evaluated on face and not in comparison to the status quo. The trusty permutation is not useful since no alternative is advocated. If the negative claims that governmental action is inherently coercive (which it probably is) and the affirmative can not claim that governmental action on balance preserves freedom (when compared to anarchy), nor can the affirmative claim that governmental action is inevitable (so why not achieve the case advantage?), how is it the affirmative would win?

The argumentative burdens of critique arguments need to be reformulated. The burdens described here seem far too liberalized. Many of these arguments have a place in debate. However, they should take the form of disadvantages, counterplans, solvency arguments, etc. If an argument can not fit in this framework, we must decide whether its unique benefits justify the degree to which the argument disadvantages affirmatives.

NB: This article only describes negative critiques levied against the affirmative. Any affirmative that attempts to launch a critique of the status quo should tread very carefully. The legitimation of critiques will more often than not work to the benefit of the negative (for obvious reasons). The reciprocity of critiques (such as it is) hardly redresses the ground imbalances discussed in this article. AR affirmatives would have to be prepared to answer all critiques whether their "case" is a critique itself or not. Reciprocity reduces the overall research burden of those teams who choose to run critiques on the affirmative. And the risks involved in running such a case guarantees that few will take that course.