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"Real World" Debate: Exploring Decision-Making Models Peter Hammer, Gonzaga University 1986 - Fertile
Ground : The Agriculture Debate |
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Walking down the corridor one can catch bits and pieces from many lively discussions. Some are preaching about the environmental dangers associated with economic growth, while others are warning of the dire economic consequences of the budget deficit. There is a heated exchange about world government and utopian socialism. Someone is all uptight over something called the keystone species. This can only be one of two places. Either it is a debate tournament, or it is a state mental hospital. It seems that one has to be either a debater or a paranoid schizophrenic to be so worried about all of the different ways mankind could destroy itself. This obsession has produced a formidable indictment that critics frequently levy at the debate activity. Their contention is that debates have no connection to the real-world. Essentially, they claim that many of the arguments advanced are outlandish, incredible and would never be heard in the hallowed halls of Congress. The observation that debate rounds frequently do not mirror the real-world, could lead to many possible conclusions. On one extreme, some might say that many of the issues considered in a debate round are simply "stupid." While I have seem many "stupid" arguments in my time, many of the "non-real-world" arguments are not among them. The fact that not all the ramifications of environmental degradation or the problems associated with an increasingly technologically-oriented society are echoed in Congress, does not mean that they are stupid. Many of them are valid and well documented. On the other extreme, some might indict Congress for being "stupid" and too short sighted to see the catastrophic implications that their policies entail. This is too great a simplification, and it does an injustice to those policy-makers who are in power. Given the fact that both debaters and congressmen are intelligent, rational people, there must be an alternative explanation for the difference between the "debate world" and the "real world." It will be the contention of this article, that the schism exists because real-world policy-makers and competitive debaters operate under distinctly different decision-making theories. Most debates are premised upon the RATIONAL-COMPREHENSIVE theory of decision-making. This model considers all possible inputs as valid considerations in the decision-making process. On the other hand, real-world policy-making is based on the SUCCESSIVE LIMITED COMPARISONS theory of decision-making. This model intentionally excludes certain types of inputs as invalid considerations in the decision-making process. The difference between these models underlies the following analysis. There are a number of issues this article explores. First it examines some of the reasons why debate should align itself more closely with real-world policy-making. Next it evaluates some of the ways that this transition can be made, stressing the need to make any change a student-centered process. The competing decision-making theories are described and critiqued. Finally, it describes some of the ways that decision-making models can be introduced and used in a debate round. Why should a debate round more closely resemble real-world decision-making? There are many reasons. If debate rounds were oriented more toward the way that decisions and policies were actually made, then they would teach more practical skills. Competitive debate has become such a hybrid activity that many of the skills that are encouraged have no relevant application outside of the round of competition in which they are used. A valid response to this objection is that the skills necessary to originate a successful "generic" argument are valuable in themselves, and are applicable in real-world policy evaluation. While this is true, the key word is originate. It takes a great deal of talent and skill to build a Rolls Royce, but it takes very little to drive it. A debater who simply picks up and uses a "generic" argument without putting something into the creative process gains little. This is especially true when these arguments show up on the high school circuit like so many used cars. Ideally, every year and in every round, the debaters should have to go through the same creative process of producing arguments that the originator of the generic argument went through, and hence, gain the consequent benefits. The important concepts to keep in mind are germaneness, relevance, and individual participation. A congressman cannot just sit back with a file of "generics" and link every bill that confronts him to a growth scenario. Instead, he must investigate and argue the most realistic implications of the measure. Debaters should learn something from this example. Given the limited time available in a debate round, the debate should center upon the most important and relevant issues. In light of this need, there must be some means of narrowing the focus of issues in the debate round, and eliminating irrelevant issues. Almost every other forum, through which issues are discussed, has such a mechanism. Administrative agencies have laws specifically limiting their jurisdiction. The legislature operates under parliamentary procedures that renders moot considerations that are not germane. Finally, in a court of law, Perry Mason can stand up and claim that Hamilton Burger's line of questioning is "Incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial." The point is that devices that prevent non-germane issues from being considered are very important in these forums. In many ways, topicality plays this function for procedural issues, but unfortunately, it has no counterpart in substantive areas, such is disadvantages. Obviously, we cannot allow affirmatives to pull a Perry Mason and object to disadvantages during the second negative constructive. This would not be practical. Some would advocate a more authoritarian solution. These people would simply ban certain types of arguments and strategies, thereby imposing preconceived standards upon the round. This approach is destructive. It is wrong because it is arbitrary. Independent debater input, intelligent discussion, and appeal are sacrificed. I firmly believe that any narrowing of relevant issues and tactics in a debate round must be controlled by the participants themselves. This belief stems from the same reasoning that condemns the mindless use of generics. If the process is not student-centered, then the debater is not involved in the creative process and is, in effect, driving, not building the car. If the debater is going to be able to provide this input, then she must educate herself as to the different possible models of decision-making. James Anderson outlines the predominate theories of decision-making in his book Public Policy-making (1979). Competitive debate fits the Rational-comprehensive theory to a tee (see, p. 9). As the name implies, there are no potential arguments that are excluded in assessing a decision. All counterplans are legitimate, all disadvantages must be considered and weighed, and every relevant fact must be taken into account. While debate functions under the rational-comprehensive theory of decision-making, the "real world" does not. This is odd because all of the reasons why the rational-comprehensive method fails in the "real world" (time constraints, lack of expertise, inadequate depth of investigation, etc.) are even more valid in the debate context. I would advocate that one way a team can make real-world considerations have more weight in a round, and render non-real-world consideration irrelevant, is to change the decision-making theory for the round. In some ways this is similar to arguing a paradigm, but it differs in one major respect. The debater is arguing not about what types of issues are legitimate, or about what type of world view one should have, but rather he is arguing about how a decision should be made, regardless of the issue. Ultimately, of course, a new decision-making theory will effect what types of issues are legitimate, but its focus is upon the "process" or the "how" of the decision, and not upon the "substance" or the "what" that is decided. Most real-world policy-makers operate under the Successive-Limited Comparisons theory of decision-making. This is a fancy name for a "branch," or "incremental" approach to decision-making. The main difference between this and the rational-comprehensive approach is the number and type of potential inputs into the decision-making process that are acceptable. The rational-comprehensive approach leaves no stone unturned whereas with the Successive -Limited Comparisons theory "analysis is drastically limited" (Lindblom, 1959, 80). There is a conscious decision not to consider every issue. This means that certain disadvantages and counterplans are deliberately excluded from consideration. If an argument is not "real world," then it is not considered. Why would anyone adopt this approach? Is it not better to consider everything before making a decision? The answer, for a number of reasons, is NO. it is not humanly possible to be completely comprehensive. It takes more time, expertise, and intellectual capacity than any human possesses. Like a computer, it is possible to exceed the capacity of the human mind. Attempting to do so can lead to the phenomenon psychologists term "overload." This is the state of helplessness that results from being exposed to too much information. It is illustrated by the guinea pig, who after failing to deal with an overload of different stimuli, will apathetically sit in a corner and chew its feet aimlessly. Campbell R. McConnell, economist, puts it in a different way. He states that "reality is too complex to be very meaningful" (1981, p.7). The bottom line is that we are limited in our ability to understand and digest reality. Therefore, we must put limitations upon the number and type of issues introduced before making a decision. Charles E. Lindblom writes in "The Science of Muddling Through": "Limits on human intellectual capacity and on available information set definite limits to man's capacity to be comprehensive. In actual fact, therefore, no one can practice the rational-comprehensive method for really complex problems, and every administrator faced with a sufficiently complex problem must find ways to simplify drastically (p.84)." One means of simplifying discussion, advocated by Lindblom, would be to limit "policy comparisons to those policies that differ in relatively small degrees from policies presently in effect (p.84)." In a debate round this would constrain the potential types of counterplans. if the affirmative team were running a farm subsidy case, then a negative counterplan advocating the establishment of a world government would be thrown out because it would not be germane. The only acceptable counterplans would be those that addressed problems similar to the affirmative, but differing in the method of solution. This would maintain the integrity of the resolutional problem area. Another means of simplification of analysis "is the practice of ignoring important possible consequences of possible policies, as well as the values attached to the neglected consequences (Lindblom, p.85)." In essence, this means that certain disadvantages must be ignored despite the fact that they are logically linked. The greater the number of levels of links between the affirmative case and the negative impact, the greater will be the chance that the disadvantage will inherently exceed human capacities. This means that policy-makers can only really examine immediate effects. it is impossible to consider second, third, and fourth level ramifications because it entails "futile attempts at superhuman comprehensiveness." This conclusion is similar to that of other authors. These types of multiply linked scenarios "depend, for their power to convince, on the acceptance of a long chain of speculation about the character of an economy or a society: speculation which, necessary to the academic enterprise as it must be, is yet always precarious and doubtful, and unfit to serve as a guide for practical action and political decision (Kedonrie, 1976, p.41)." Lindblom provides examples of two such arguments that are particularly relevant to the 1986-1987 high school debate resolution. These are types of arguments that policy-makers cannot consider. "An administrator assisting in the formation of agricultural economic policy cannot in the first place be competent on all possible policies. He cannot even fully comprehend one policy entirely. In planning a soil bank program, he cannot successfully anticipate the impact of higher or lower farm income on, say urbanization -- the possible consequent loosening of family ties, possible consequent eventual need for revisions in social security and further implications for tax problems arising out of new federal responsibilities for social security and municipal responsibilities for urban services. Nor, to follow another line of repercussions, can he work through the soil bank program's effect on prices for agricultural products in foreign markets and consequent implications for foreign relations, including those arising out of economic rivalry between the United States and the USSR (p.84)." Mr. Lindblom would have made quite a second negative speaker under the rational-comprehensive theory. His point is well taken, however. Given the fact that we cannot consider everything, we must exclude some important potential issues from our decision-making model. The central question is: "How does a debater prove, in the parameters of a debate round, that the opponents argument exceeds these limits of intellectual capacity, and should therefore be disregarded?" Essentially, the debater will have to advocate and defend a new decision-making theory, and present standards for argumentation and tests of evidence, that are consistent with the new model. This can easily be done in the form of an observation or an underview. The observation would indict the rational-comprehensive theory. It would have to successfully challenge the premise that all arguments are valid, and that everything must be considered before making a decision. It may be helpful to use some quotes from experts in the field of public policy analysis such as Lindblom or Anderson. The team must be able to demonstrate a need to exclude certain types of argumentation. Once this is done, standards must be presented to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable types of arguments. These standards may vary from round to round, but they exist to answer the question: "What is relevant?" The primary test of relevance is whether or not an argument exceeds limits of human comprehensibility. Is the impact an immediate consequence of the plan? Is the issue a real-world consideration? One standard would be the demand for specific link evidence to exist. This standard would ensure that the argument really applied. If the disadvantage is a true and relevant consequence, then it seems reasonable to expect a specific link to exist. This standard also ensures that the integrity of the negative's link evidence is upheld. If the link evidence is general and vague, then it is very possible that the author of the evidence would view its application to the affirmative case as ludicrous. A second standard would call for the exclusion of multiply linked consequences. By multiply linked, I mean levels of links or the number of steps between the affirmative action and the arguments impact. Debaters may want to argue a certainty decision rulel that is, the judge should vote upon the most certain consequence and not upon the largest impact. A real-world view of consequences is three dimensional. The judge must not only examine the size of the impact, but also its propensity. It can be thought of geometrically in terms of the volume. No matter how large a two dimensional figure is, it has zero volume. It only has volume when a third dimension is added. This is the dimension of certainty or probability. The greater the certainty, the greater the volume, and hence the greater the impact. A third standard would be a demand for empirical support of the link. If the negative causal sequence is correct, then there should be hard evidence in the past that similar actions produced similar results. Farm policies are not a new phenomena. There have been many policies in the past which, if the disadvantage is true, should have triggered similar consequences. If no empirical evidence exists, then this fact should decrease the credibility of the argument. This is one of the benefits of policy making through successive comparisons. Since action is taken in a slow deliberate manner, with strong empirical support, disadvantages can be detected and corrected. Many negatives win because their disadvantages are linear. They tell the judge that every additional action causes an additional increase in the impact, or risk of impact. This significantly reduces the need to demonstrate uniqueness. What affirmatives forget, however, is that linearity is a two way street. If the argument is true, then not only will every future action get an increased linear result, but every past action must have produced similar consequences. Therefore, no linear disadvantage can be accepted absent empirical support. One must keep in mind, when arguing this standard, the difference between empirical support for links and empirical support for impacts. This prevents being stumped by the response "how can the negative provide empirical support for a disadvantage ending in nuclear war since no nuclear war has ever occurred?" The standard calls for empirical support of the conditions leading up to the event, such as international tension or militarism. It does not call for empirical support of the final end result. A fourth standard that could be advanced is the need for reversibility. The judge must be provided proof that the disadvantage impact is avoidable. In other words, there must be some assurance that voting against the affirmative will prevent the negative consequence. Many generic, big impact scenarios lack this reversibility. To accept the links is also to accept a perverse logic that says that the consequence is inevitable, and that nothing can be done. If this is the case, then it does not matter if the affirmative plan is accepted or rejected. This is distinct from uniqueness because this standard introduces a future dimension. Not only must the negative prove that nothing in the past will cause the disadvantage, but they must demonstrate that nothing obvious in the future will trigger the consequence. The last standard to be considered involves potential tests of evidence. If the opponent can produce evidence that meets the above standard, then is the evidence of acceptable quality? In a court of law or in a Congressional hearing, who is testifying is just as important as what they are saying. Unfortunately, in a debate round, this does not receive the attention that it deserves. In many ways, this is yet another manifestation of the rational comprehensive decision-making model. If everything is valid and a potential input into the decision-making process, then the fact that something was said is more important than who it was said by. There is no quality control. In advocating a new decision-making model, therefore, it is necessary to examine both the content and quality of the evidence. The first consideration is the qualifications of the source. Is the person qualified to make such a statement? It is also important to ask: What are the potential motives or biases of the source? What is the purpose of the publication? What are the hidden or implicit assumptions underlying the conclusion? Is the conclusion supported within the evidence? These are all important questions in evaluating evidence. Often times, sources will have a particular ax to grind. Other times, the purpose of the publication is to drum up political support or to motivate a particular audience. This may be the case with much of the socialism evidence. If a source claims that there will be a socialist revolution in the United States between 1986 and 1992 [which some of them do] they may be trying to gain supporters or influence by exaggerating their own importance. Sometimes, a publication is totally speculative. Science writers may speculate about fictional scenarios in a big game of "what if?", while debaters quote them as if they were making authoritative assessments. I have seen cases where wild satire and intentionally absurd statements come back as factual claims. At a different level, most serious academic writers develop explicit assumptions upon which their conclusions are based. It is really doing these writers a disservice to report their conclusions without their reservations. The bottom line is that exploring the intentions and qualifications of sources is important. Finally there are some things that must be kept in mind when using this strategy. The first thing that must be remembered when advocating the Successive Limited Comparisons decision-making theory is the old adage: "those who live in glass houses should not throw rocks." This means that one's arguments must conform to one's standards. The debater's positions must be internally consistent. The decision to commit to a particular decision-making theory entails a commitment to a comprehensive strategy. To be successful, the debater must go out on a limb, invest time into the position, and treat it seriously. If she does not project a coherent and comprehensive image, and if her practice does not conform to her preaching, then the strategy can backfire. An appropriate analogy can be found in the Star Trek episode that placed the crew of the Enterprise at the O.K. Corral. To survive the gunfight, they had to be one hundred percent convinced that the bullets were not real. Any doubt would make them vulnerable. Likewise, advocating a decision-making model cannot be done half-heartedly. It must be a meticulous process. In essence, the debater is creating a new lens through which the judge and participants view issues. Great attention must be paid to detail and clarity. When I used this strategy in competition, it was only after careful preparation, and in conjunction with an affirmative case and strategy that was complimentary. This article barely scratches the surface of the possible use of decision-making theory and policy science in a debate round. There are good reasons why real-world policy-makers use the methods and practices that they do. Many of these reasons can be adopted in a debate round to alter how issues are viewed. While there has been plenty of whining that debate rounds fail to mirror the real world, there has been little constructive input as to what could be done to bring about a change. Research into areas such as decision-making theory, policy science, policy analysis, and public policy-making could provide some needed insight. More attention needs to be paid to the process of decision-making and how decisions should be made in the context of a debate round. A good process is a prerequisite to a good result.
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