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Count Him Not As An Enemy: Critical International Relations
Theory in Debate
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Jim Lyle, Wake Forest University 1998
- (De)Baiting the Bear: Policy Options Toward Russia |
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With the development of the atomic weapon during the course of World War II, the study of international relations gained a significance unparalleled in history. The capacity that nuclear weapons possessed for destruction on such an enormous scale, with the potential to wipe out all life on the planet in minutes, placed a tremendous burden on humankind to ensure that such a nightmare would never occur. In approaching this dilemma, strategic thinkers selected an approach based on Mutually Assured Destruction, ensuring that one side was deterred from attacking the other because they would be destroyed in the process, and vice-versa. This cost-benefit analysis is known as Realism, through which the military and political machinery seeks to explain the world as some fixed thing existing "out there," consisting of stable variables that can be identified, interpreted, and manipulated. In their article "Critical International Relations Theories: Applications to the Russia Topic," appearing in the April 1998 Rostrum, Jason Hernandez and Steve Mancuso, of the University of Michigan, discuss the role that an examination of International Relations theory can play on this debate topic. They primarily examine the role that Critical International Relations Theory (CT) plays in the prominent Threat Construction argument. We intend to expand the discussion of both CT and the Threat Construction position by exploring the theory lying behind the arguments and demonstrating applications of the evidence contained in this handbook, as well as providing an applied example of CT as it relates to positions dependent upon strategic deterrence theory. The emphasis is on arguments that one would advance while running Threat Construction or attacking the logic of deterrence, but we will discuss what we consider to be some of the stronger answers to these positions in the conclusion of this article. Realism vs. Critical International Relations Theory Realism is highly dependent on the thought of 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who believed that humans were inherently selfish and evil. Hobbes thought that the natural human propensity for wronging others necessitated creation of the state, which served as a vehicle to maintain order. Just as he believed that humans were naturally inclined to serve their own interests at the expense of others, he believed that states naturally competed for wealth and prestige. Thus, contemporary Realists have promoted wealth and influence as primary goals for their individual nation-states, achievable through any means necessary. Following from the Hobbesian state of nature, there are four primary tenets of Realist theory. First, Realist theory believes that an objective reality exists, which can be identified and acted upon, and denies the importance of rhetoric in constructing what is constituted as reality. Second, Realism frames the nation-state as the central actor in international affairs. Third, Realism believes that the nation-state is an individual unit that exists within an anarchic international system, where it must compete with other nation-states for finite resources. Although more explicit in some accounts than others, this generally includes some degree of belief that nation-states lust for power. Fourth, Realism holds that the nation-state will act in a rational manner, utilizing a cost-benefit analysis that strategically assesses the power of competing nation-states, in terms of wealth, resource control, and military capabilities. As a result, a state will act in what it deems to be the most appropriate manner, using whatever means are necessary to achieve the ends of the national interest, including the option of direct, physical violence. Although Realists can point to the lack of a massive conventional or nuclear exchange between the superpowers during the Cold War as evidence of the success of Realism, they cannot prove that deterrence logic specifically averted such catastrophe. Historical surveys, in fact, have demonstrated that deterrence logic is not only unreliable, but actually increases the likelihood of the outbreak of war. A line of Critical International Relations Theories developed in response to the perceived failure of Realism. There is no stock Critical International Relations Theory, but rather there exist a collection of theories that do not believe in an objective reality in International Relations. Chris Brown, a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, defines CT in relation to the current Realist paradigm, not as an ahistorical "given," but rather as "the emergence of self-conscious individuals and meaning-generating communities" (195). CT therefore considers a multi-perspectival approach, including the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, sociology, political science, linguistics, and cultural studies. The implication of this alternative method of viewing International Relations is that state actors are not static. Current US government policy seeks to define other nation-states as ahistorical "enemies" or "allies." Thus, the human rights violations of such "allies" as Israel, Turkey, and Tunisia are for the most part overlooked, while the US applies massive diplomatic (and even economic) pressure to "enemies" like China for human rights abuses. CT, alternatively, views other nations as dynamic and multi-faceted, with both good and bad aspects. We do not have to be for or against other countries, but can recognize that multiple forces are at work within them, both good and bad. The Realist approach simply denounces the "enemies" (Iraq, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, the Russian "hard-liners"), and as a result, entirely devotes US policy to defeating these other countries, which should bring "security" to the US and its overseas interests. Yet this effort to defeat so-called "rogue states" necessarily polarizes relations into "us against them." A crucial argument of CT is that countries that we label as "threats" actually become threats due to the offensive positioning of the United States, which forces the "enemies" into counter-measures which turn the designation of "enemy" into a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is the essence of the Threat Construction argument The Application of International Relations Theory in a Debate Round: Threat Construction The Threat Construction argument is uniquely appropriate on a Russia topic, as it was the Soviet "threat" which ushered the Realist conception of foreign policy into prominence after the conclusion of World War II. Suspicions between the two countries have remained high even after the collapse of Communism. Hernandez and Mancuso provide two examples of affirmative cases which fall prey to the criticism of constructing threats, a "case that deters potential Russian aggression by stationing troops in neighboring states" and "a case that uses economic sanctions to influence Russian behavior" (17). One can imagine a number of other cases which link to the Threat Construction argument, such as an affirmative that dismantles the Russian nuclear stockpile with the rationale that such "rogue states" as Iran and Iraq are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons and, once acquired, would use them against Israel. Murray Edelman, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, provides three examples of how the enemy image functions in the U.S.-Russian dynamic. Initially, he notes the effect of our accounts of Russia's intentions, explaining that "[t]o declare that a Russian proposal for mutual reductions in armaments is only a public relations ploy is to arouse the suspicion that it may be more than that" (E2). This demonstrates how US perceptions affect the construction of Russia's foreign policy, as motives are ascribed to Russia's intentions with authority that is difficult for anyone to claim. The definition of Russia's intentions emerges from accounts that are not necessarily objective, instead possessing intentional psychological and linguistic force. This brings us to Edelman's second example of how our traditional perception of Russia-as-enemy can be inaccurate, as he argues that "[p]eople with credentials accordingly have a vested interest in specific problems and in specific origins for them" (E3). For example, those in the defense industry are able to justify the West's massive expenditures on the military industrial complex by pointing to potential threats against which the West needs protection. Edelman refers to the claims made by those with special interests in the arguments and images advanced as construction of the "political spectacle." He utilizes that term in refutation of the Realist conception that the threats posed by other nation-states are objective and "out there," reminding us that our notions of other actors' intentions are an amalgamation of images, perceptions, and biases. Third, Edelman notes past inconsistencies and double standards in our perception of crises when dealing with Russia (E4). His example is the "Cuban Missile Crisis" in 1962, in which the Soviet Union's intention to place missiles in Cuba was defined as a crisis even though "the stationing of American missiles as close to the Soviet Union even earlier was not defined as a crisis by either country." This demonstrates how those who wish to frame other nation-states as enemies attempt to mold themselves into ahistorical heroes, as their "narrative establishes the identities of enemy and victim-savior by defining the latter as emerging from an innocent past and as destined to help bring about a brighter future world cleansed of the contamination the enemy embodies" (E8). All the arguments that the negative advances against the affirmative's harms contention provide alternative hypotheses of the rationales of actors singled out as threats by the affirmative case, competing with the enemy image presented by the affirmative team. What are the consequences of viewing other nation-states as enemies? Initially, Ronnie Lipschutz, a University of California at Santa Cruz Assistant Professor of Politics, explains that in order to validate our notion of security we require "an 'other' to help specify the conditions of insecurity" (E11). At some point, this enemy ceases to be real. Lipschutz turns to the contemporary French philosopher Jean Baudrillard's notion of hyperreality, in which he argues that we are at a point in history in which our representations of reality no longer provide a false representation of reality, but instead hide the fact "that the real is no longer real." In this case, the imagined threat constitutes that which is no longer real, and the unreal in turn, dictates our security policy: "It is the imagined, unnamed party, with the clandestinely assembled and crude atomic device, and not the thousands of reliable, high-yield warheads mounted on missiles poised to launch at a moment's notice, that creates fear, terror. and calls for greater surveillance and enforcement." When Lipschutz refers to the fact that we don't consider "the thousands of reliable, high-yield warheads mounted on missiles poised to launch at a moment's notice" as threats, he is referring to the threat that other nations think we pose to them. When Edelman previously discussed our own hero image that we attempt to contrast with the enemy image of the "other," his point is that we ignore the threat that we pose to others; focusing on the atrocities committed by others while ignoring those committed by ourselves or our allies. Next, Ole Waever, a senior researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, argues that security and insecurity are not binary opposites (E12). When we increase our own security through arms acquisitions or offensive posturing, we cause insecurity in those at whom these policies are aimed. They, in turn, respond to the threat that we pose to them through an increase in armaments and by mirroring our offensive postures. Thus, those nation-states that were initially imagined threats can be constructed into becoming threats. Lipschutz even poses the idea that these "enemies" lack an objective reality outside of our constructions of them (E13). Waever therefore argues that the only way to avoid insecurity is to avoid the rubric of "security" and "insecurity" altogether. This argument is known in the literature as the "security dilemma," implying that there is no good solution to security threats within the current security framework. The Threat Construction argument has a number of uses in a debate round. First, the prospect that the affirmative's threats are imagined indicts their harms contention while proving that the affirmative cannot solve the problem that they isolate. The perspective from which they approach the problem is responsible for the anarchical system of nation-states in which relations are zero-sum and all actors compete for wealth, prestige, and influence. There will never be complete security in this world. Hernandez and Mancuso explain that the negative "can depict the affirmative case and plan as an incomplete snapshot of world politics that acts on a temporary problem with an incomplete solution" (18). Regardless of whether the affirmative solves the specific problem which they isolate, security threats will continue post the plan, and even intensify due to the need to construct ever graver threats, in accordance with Baudrillard's hyperreality hypothesis. Second, the argument serves as a case turn. We can never solve problems similar to the harms isolated by the affirmative by moving in the direction of security, only away from it (E23). The affirmative proposal is a step in the wrong direction. If the negative team can prove that threats have not yet been constructed in the area which the affirmative case tackles (for example, by winning their case take-outs as alternative readings of the motives of those actors which the affirmative views as "threats"), then they will win a unique turn to the case. Third, the negative can question the affirmative team's rhetorical approach to International Relations, just as CT scholars often attack the Realist worldview from a linguistic angle. Despite Realism's appeals, rhetoric is not a mere tool that describes a factual reality that exists independent of our interactions with it; rhetoric identifies, structures, and establishes coherence among our conceptualizations of the world, and plays an important role in constructing reality and guiding future policy options. As a result, it is very important to examine policy rhetoric, to expose the ways that it reveals and silences particular aspects of the world. This is what Waever means when he describes "security" as a speech act, explaining that "[b]y uttering 'security,' a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it " (E1). Critique or "Mainstream" Policy Argument? After the discussion of the rhetorical implications of the Realist approach to International Relations, one may be tempted to categorize the Threat Construction argument as a critique. Indeed, it is listed under the "Critiques and Counterplans" section of the DRG. However, upon closer examination, these strict categories become much less relevant for International Relations arguments that challenge the predominant Realist paradigm. Critiques are usually thought of by their detractors as disadvantages that lack uniqueness (and often, specific links as well), while many critique proponents have ceased to label them at all, merely referring to their positions as "arguments." The CT literature is where, we believe, there truly is a breakdown in the sharp categorical distinction between critiques and "mainstream" arguments. An example of the difficulty in categorizing arguments as critique or "mainstream" can be witnessed even in the DRG. The Shunning position also eschews Realism, and asks the judge to endorse something that is not occurring in the status quo (that the United States forego relations with human rights abusers and other unjust regimes). However, it is featured in the "Disadvantages" section of the handbook, because it is considered a disadvantage with impacts, some of which are deontological. Likewise, Threat Construction can be thought of as a disadvantage, with some impacts that are deontological. Hernandez and Mancuso do not examine the applications of CT in critique form, instead presenting the "mainstream" uses of the Threat Construction argument. They provide advice on utilizing Threat Construction in a comparative advantage framework, running it as a disadvantage in one of two ways. The first potential approach is the argument that "policy makers are gradually shifting the way that they look at the world, away from a Realist paradigm" (19) and that the affirmative plan's Realist reasoning forces American policymaking back to the harmful assumptions of Realism. A second disadvantage that they offer is designed to show that "the affirmative plan is counterproductive because it is based upon inferior theoretical assumptions" (19). Of these two approaches, we recommend the latter. However, it is not necessary to go to such lengths to categorize the argument. If you win the basic components of the Threat Construction position, you will win the debate round whether you call the argument a disadvantage, a critique, or a case turn. (Note that it is still important to explain precisely how the position interacts with the affirmative case; we are merely saying that the labels are irrelevant.) One does not need to refer to the position as a critique for fear that it isn't unique. Threat Construction turns the affirmative case. If a house is on fire and you have a flame-thrower in your hands, you wouldn't try to put out the fire with a flame-thrower just because "the house is already on fire, so my efforts can only make the situation better and not worse." Turning to the Realist paradigm to solve a "security threat" is the equivalent of trying to fight fire with fire. Strategic Deterrence: A Case Study in the Failure of Realism Deterrence, which Luke describes as "an attempt by party A to prevent party B from undertaking a course of action which A regards as undesirable, by threatening to inflict unacceptable costs upon B in the event that the action is taken" (E66), is an important consequence of Realist logic, and is likely to play a significant role on the Russia topic. Debate examples of deterrence include affirmatives that increase US military resources and commitments vis-à-vis Russia to check potential aggression, and such negative disadvantages as Readiness, which claims that placing US resources in one area trades off with resources for other areas, thereby reducing- the level of U.S. military power in various critical re-ions of the world. We will therefore consider a few ways that debaters can challenge this logic. Although deterrence posturing can be considered independent of Threat Construction, it makes sense to consider them together, for as Buzan notes, deterrence needs a threat to exist, and Threat Construction needs a "solution" to the threat (EIIO). The first indictment of deterrence is primarily a challenge to the specific solvency of deterrence mechanisms. This approach informs us of the unworkability of deterrence; it won't solve because the other side won't adequately perceive the US action, or else deterrence only escalates the conflict by encouraging the "enemy" to take countermeasures that nullify American action. Subsection D of "deterrence bad" (E122-EI36) evidences these claims. The negative should also utilize specific evidence discussing the current geopolitical context. Analysis of the US/Russia dynamic can include such aspects as Russian nationalism ensuring that the US is seen as provocative, specific equipment being highly destabilizing, and the failure of current US deterrence efforts toward Russia. This challenge also allows the negative to run disadvantages that would normally contradict the moral impacts of a more critical approach, such as a Readiness disadvantage, a Clinton disadvantage with ASAT impacts, or a sphere of influence disadvantage. The second approach, which might be the most "critical," is more of a "procedural" challenge to deterrence, or Realism broadly. This line of criticism seeks to indict the problem-solution method of action that has developed out of the thinking of the Enlightenment. Critics of the problem-solution format include Gray Cox and William Spanos. These authors challenge the application of a natural science method to the social science world, which they believe cannot be reduced to a clear set of variables that can be identified and acted upon. The use of such an approach for policymaking, by only considering certain variables, limits out that which fails to meet these criteria, and enables the military to silence discussion of the violence that it creates (E 108). Although such a method of criticism is not fully developed in this handbook, the evidence within does provide a potential foundation that can be built upon with outside research. The third fine of indictment which is the handbook's most fully developed, integrates pieces of the first two approaches to support the primary aim of questioning the moral legitimacy of violence as a means to an end. Because Realism offers an "objective" view of the world based on a scientific problem-solution decision calculus, it fails to consider the ethics and morality of its action. If "A" is a threat, then it must be eliminated. And, because Realists focus on military capabilities as a key determinant of power and available courses of action, an increase in military power-projection becomes a legitimate means to solve the problem. A second major reason that Realists fail to properly evaluate the moral consequences of their reasoning is that although Realism's conception of the state arises out of the sovereign and the individual, Realism then attempts to divorce the state from its citizens and place it hierarchically "above" them. Even though the state metaphorically represents the individual, and can mediate conflicts between individuals, there is no corresponding "super-state" to oversee the nation-state. The nation-state remains in an international anarchy, forced to resort to violence to protect those who have created it, and placed in an arena that cannot "afford" the price of morality. These premises of the nation-state's role are flawed, however, for two reasons. First, they wrongly presuppose the ahistorical centrality and supremacy of the state. As the Threat Construction discussion has shown, meanings do not have a prior existence but are generated by individuals and groups of individuals. Second, these premises fail to realize the relationship that exists between the state and the individual. This can be demonstrated on a state to individual level, and an individual to state level. Because the state (specifically the military apparatus) is given such a primacy under Realist logic, people look to the state as a model for their lives, and thus replicate the violence of the state on an individual level. As Kevin Clements, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Colorado, explains, legitimizing such a system "stimulates the development of a thriving weapons culture (for states and individuals)" (E 105). Likewise, Roxanne Dory, a Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, argues that in framing "x" (for example, Europe) as a key area testing US leadership and a pivotal ground where US and Russian interests compete, we are left with no conclusion but to militarily intervene on the behalf of Europe when we detect a "threat 'to it (E84). In the case of the individual to state relationship, Clements and Albert Camus, a French philosopher, explain how individual legitimization of violence and murder entrench such a worldview at a systemic level (E 102, E 1 18-9). Realism's failure to consider the importance of rhetorical construction leaves it typed in a moral abyss. As a result of these two indictments, many critical theorists reject the legitimization of violence. For as Camus and Richard Norman, a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Kent, have argued, we must always reject violence because a willingness to kill devalues the life of all and leaves us in a world with no meaning, a submission to nihilism (E65, E97-9). And, as Camus argues, when we kill in the name of peace, we immediately divorce ourselves from the purpose invoked to condone the act (E1OO-1). There are a few responses to this position that the opposition is likely to argue. First, they might argue the irrelevance of the individual, that "the ballot has no impact" or that "we use deterrence now, non-unique." This line of argument, however, is flawed. First, as shown above, the individual is critical to reinforcing, or challenging, the state's approach to deterring "threats," and individual speech acts can be given significance. Second, as the "extinguishing fire with a flame-thrower" example shows, the impact of individual endorsement and whether deterrence is being used now are both irrelevant The impact of the negative's argument is that the affirmative policy makes the problem worse, warranting, a negative ballot period. The second major argument the opposition might raise is that they save lives and inaction allows people to die. The responses to this argument are two-fold. Initially, it fails to acknowledge the requirements of deterrence: the willingness by the US to enforce the threat by attacking Russia in the event of instability (E67) and the willingness to do so disproportionately (E70- 1). These requirements are in themselves immoral, in that they express overt willingness to inflict violence. Second, the affirmative argument presupposes that those who will die, if there is inaction, is a given. This ignores the possible, as opposed to definite, nature of interpretation. And it ignores the importance of rhetoric to framing the situation. As Norman notes, these consequentialist appeals are insufficient to justify violence (E 1 12). A final major argument that the affirmative can raise is some sort of "permutation" of the two views. There are two major answers to the permutation. First, to allow an exception (this act of deterrence) recreates the rule of Realism, and other instances will later become allowed again (E 103-4). Second, the permutation makes no sense. Engaging in deterrence while voicing commitment to pacifism eliminates any hope of solving the case, and only risks misperceptions and conflict If the US increased force levels in Europe vis-a-vis Russia, and at the same time swore to non-violence, the Russians would be confused. They would conclude either that the US policy of non-violence was a weak attempt at a trick, or else that the attempted US deterrent lacked legitimacy due to the accompanying doctrine of pacifism. The misperceptions resulting from contradictory actions could be devastating. Conclusion: Putting Theory into Practice Although this article was obviously written with an eye for the negative, we do not think that the affirmative arsenal lacks strong arguments. The debate about Realism versus CT occupies much time and energy in the academy, and cannot be resolved in the space of a DRG article. Threat Construction debates can be rewarding for both the affirmative and negative, especially when both sides are well versed in the literature. Some arguments that we think merit examination include John Mearsheimer's defenses of Realism, the lack of alternatives and empirics in CT (E48-50), the argument that war and violence are inescapable because we don't have an alternative to those methods of relations (E137-141), and the competing moralities that can force the state to make a choice between protecting its own citizens and avoiding violence toward other nation-states (EI48, EI63-4). The best methods of becoming adept at running arguments based on CT are engaging in these positions frequently and reading literature in the field of Critical International Relations Theory. One can prepare to advance CT in a debate round by immersing oneself in its literature, just as a debater who desires to master an affirmative case or disadvantage would seek to read everything s/he can about it. A good starting point would be to find the sources cited for evidence in the DRG, as well as consulting those listed in our Bibliography, which includes authors who do not appear in the handbook. Running these positions frequently and learning the responses to them will also aid in mastery of CT's application to debate. Engaging in this discussion can be rewarding, especially when done well. 1"Yet count
him not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother." - II Thessalonians
3:15.
Beer, Francis A.
and Robert Hariman, eds. Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International
Relations. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 1996. |