

# 1969 NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT FINAL DEBATE: SHOULD EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY BE SIGNIFICANTLY CURTAILED?

Edited by Stanley G. Rives

The Twenty-Third National Debate Tournament sponsored by the American Forensic Association was held at Northern Illinois University on April 14-17, 1969. The forty-four participating teams debated the national intercollegiate debate proposition: "Resolved, that executive control of United States foreign policy should be significantly curtailed."

Eight preliminary and four elimination rounds resulted in this final debate between Harvard University and the University of Houston.<sup>1</sup> Representing Harvard on the affirmative were Richard Lewis and Joel Perwin; for the negative from Houston, Mike Miller and David Seikel. As a result of preliminary round competition, Mr. Seikel was named first place speaker in the tournament and Mr. Perwin second place speaker. The debate was won by the affirmative team

of Harvard.<sup>2</sup> The text of the debate follows.<sup>3</sup>

*First Affirmative Constructive:*

Richard Lewis, Harvard

Frankly, I want my mother. [laughter] "All the people who lined the streets began to cry, 'Just look at the Emperor's new clothes. How beautiful they are!' Then suddenly a little child piped up, 'But the Emperor has no clothes on. He has no clothes on at all!'"<sup>4</sup> In 1947 the United States created the Central Intelligence Agency and donned the cloak of secrecy to pursue communism. Experience has proven the cloak we donned was nothing more than the Emperor's new clothes, hiding far less than we have long pretended and exposing America to peril.

Because Joel and I believe it is time we all recognized the American Emperor's mistake, we stand resolved that executive control of United States for-

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<sup>1</sup> The debate was held in the University Center at Northern Illinois University on April 17, 1969. The coaches of the two teams were Professors Lawrence H. Tribe of Harvard and William B. English of Houston. The other teams which qualified for the elimination rounds were Albion College, Boston College, Brown University, Canisius College, University of Denver, University of Georgia, Loyola University of Los Angeles, Michigan State University, Oberlin College, Oklahoma State University, University of the Pacific, University of Redlands, San Fernando Valley State College, and the University of California at Los Angeles. The tournament director was Professor Roger Hufford of Clarion State College, Pennsylvania, and the tournament host was Professor M. Jack Parker of Northern Illinois University.

<sup>2</sup> Judges for the debate were Professors John Boaz, Illinois State University; Jim Chesebro, Concordia College; Ted Jackson, Michigan State University; Herbert James, Dartmouth College; John Lehman, Kansas State Teachers College at Emporia; Dan Rohrer, Oberlin College; and James Unger, Boston College. The decision was 5-2 for the affirmative.

<sup>3</sup> The debate was edited from a tape recording. Except for the correction of obviously unintended errors, this is as close to a verbatim transcript as was possible to obtain from the recording. Sources were verified insofar as possible as indicated by footnotes.

<sup>4</sup> Hans Christian Andersen, "The Emperor's New Clothes."

eign policy should be significantly curtailed. We believe the executive should be prohibited from carrying out covert operations, that is, attempts to tamper with the structure of any country or institution in the conduct of foreign policy while concealing our involvement.

Our first contention: Discovery of covert operations undermines American objectives; discovery of covert operations undermines American objectives. There are three dimensions to the harm. First, discovery strengthens communism; it strengthens communism. When America is discovered attempting to dictate a nation's political future, that nation resists our influence by enlisting communist support.

Consider these two examples: One, Laos. In 1958 the CIA spent \$310 million in a covert attempt to defeat the Communist Pathet Lao and elect a pro-Western cabinet. Noted journalist Fred Cook wrote in 1961: The inevitable consequence, once the plot was exposed, was a crushing election victory by the Communists who then used American foreign aid to support Communist battalions.<sup>5</sup> Discovery of our operation thus promoted communism. But the CIA was not content. Unable to purchase a pro-Western government, it installed one with a military coup in 1961. Enraged at the United States and now backed by communist power, the ousted leaders began to carve up the country. In three years America had sacrificed Laos to communism, a serious setback in itself. But this defeat also made a long-term con-

tribution to communist strength elsewhere—in Vietnam. The *New York Times*, April 25, 1966: Following the CIA fiasco, "Pro-Communist Laotians . . . were never again driven from the border of North Vietnam, and it is through that region that the Vietcong . . . have been supplied and replenished. . . ."<sup>6</sup>

Our second example is Burma. Since 1949, the CIA had directed thousands of Nationalist Chinese troops who had seized a Burmese province and were preparing to invade mainland China. When American responsibility was exposed in 1952, Burma abandoned her pro-Western stance, renounced American aid, and moved closer to Peking. The *New York Times* concluded that nothing, nothing so helped the Communists in Burma as discovery that the CIA had directed the colony of Nationalist Chinese troops.<sup>7</sup> Discovery strengthens communism, and that's our first subpoint.

Our second subpoint: Discovery injures the innocent; it injures the innocent. When a CIA agent suffers as a result of underhanded tactics, it can be said that he knew what he was getting into. But when innocent people are harmed—people who are unaware that they are part of an international intrigue—then clearly a basic moral standard has been violated, and that we cannot tol-

<sup>6</sup> *New York Times*, April 25, 1966, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Fred J. Cook, "The CIA," *Nation* (June 24, 1961), 560: "Then the votes were counted. The Communists, instead of being crushed, won a crushing victory. The House committee later reported that the Communists had won nine seats, and their sympathizers an additional four. The Royal Cabinet, indeed, had to install the pro-Red leader as the minister who, in the future, would control U.S. Foreign Aid funds in Laos; it had to be agreed that, henceforth, two battalions of pro-Communist troops actually would be supported by U.S. funds."

<sup>7</sup> *New York Times*, October 22, 1954, p. 5: "Nothing has been so damaging to United States prestige in Burma or so much help to the Burmese Communists as the operations of Nationalist Chinese troops in the northern border area, according to international opinion here [Rangoon]. . . . Burmese here interviewed say United States agents were involved in the aerial supply of arms from Formosa to the Nationalist bands commanded by Gen Li Mi." The effect cited in the previous sentence of the text is documented in the *New York Times*, April 25, 1966, p. 20: "By the time the 'anti-Communist' force could be disbanded, and the CIA could wash its hand of it, Burma had renounced American aid, threatened to quit the United Nations and moved closer to Peking."

erate. Two examples: One, private organizations. Using the National Student Association as a propaganda weapon, the CIA secretly funded that organization. Unaware of the source, the NSA gladly accepted the money. Disaster came with discovery. As newsmen dug deeper, hundreds of other private institutions—unions, charities, and churches—were identified as unknowing recipients of CIA funds. Professor Richard Hunt of Harvard described the result: The exposure of CIA connections undermined the independence of countless innocent organizations; the work of many private institutions abroad was jeopardized, reputations were injured, careers were shattered, and charitable foundations were shaken.<sup>8</sup> Thus, scores of innocent individuals were gravely injured simply because the CIA chose to use them.

But more sinister cases have come to light. Our second example: Berlin, 1954. Taking young and easily influenced students, the CIA plunged them into the explosive postwar German underground, directing them in secret maneuvers in preparation for an invasion of East Germany. When the operation was discovered, it was the students who suffered. Louis Hagen, writing in *The Secret War for Europe*, notes that the world “. . . had to watch the sad aftermath of this [CIA] affair. Scores of these misled youths were arrested in East Germany as alleged . . . provocateurs and were sentenced to terms of up to nine years' hard labour.”<sup>9</sup> No more than pawns in the Cold War, innocent people suffer as

the CIA escapes to plot further operations. Our second subpoint: Discovery injures the innocent.

But we pay yet another price when covert operations are discovered. Our third subpoint: Discovery threatens the peace; it threatens the peace. There is a danger of retaliation whenever the communists discover the origin of plots against them. A perilous incident occurred in Formosa, 1954. The CIA masterminded guerrilla attacks on the Chinese mainland from Taiwan, and the Red Chinese reacted with violence. Fred Cook comments: Having isolated the origin of the operation, Red China blasted Quemoy and Matsu with heavy artillery.<sup>10</sup> The United States and China had been pushed to the point of open conflict. Mr. Cook concludes: The world stood dangerously close to total war.<sup>11</sup> Professor Paul Blackstock of Chicago

<sup>10</sup> Fred J. Cook, “The CIA,” 558: “Destructive as such incidents are to America's image, they do not menace the peace of the world like the more grandiose CIA endeavors that led directly to the crisis of Quemoy and Matsu. In the early 1950's, the CIA established on Formosa an outfit known as Western Enterprises, Inc. This was a thinly disguised ‘cover’ for the CIA, whose agents, an incommunicative lot, became known on the island as ‘the spooks.’ These ‘spooks’ played an active role in the build-up of Chiang's forces on the off-shore islands and the raids that were launched from there. As Stewart Alsop wrote, the CIA was ‘responsible for organizing and equipping the Nationalist guerrillas who raided the mainland from the off-shore islands.’ These ‘commando-type guerrilla raids’ were ‘sometimes mounted in battalion strength,’ Alsop related. In addition, the off-shore islands were used for reconnaissance, leaflet dropping, occasional bombing forays, and for blockading such Chinese ports as Amoy, on the mainland opposite Quemoy. These offensive gestures apparently nettled the Chinese Reds, a very unreasonable and touchy folk, and in the first week of September, 1954, they became so incensed that they blasted Quemoy with heavy artillery barrages.”

<sup>11</sup> Fred J. Cook, “The CIA,” 558: “Two American officers of the Military Advisory Group stationed on the island [Quemoy] were killed, and the American public, in its shock at such unprovoked aggression, was whipped up to a point where it might very easily have plunged into Chiang's war. In fact, Alsop wrote, that ‘although no more than a tiny

<sup>8</sup> Richard M. Hunt, “The CIA Exposures: End of an Affair,” *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Spring, 1969), 215 and 216: “In addition, the activities of this agency [the CIA] had resulted in jeopardizing the work of many genuinely private foundations in foreign countries.” “Individual reputations had been injured, private organizations compromised, and foundations shaken.”

<sup>9</sup> Louis Hagen, *The Secret War for Europe* (New York: 1969), p. 80.

stated our conclusion: Our covert operations have created major threats to peace.<sup>12</sup> Our first contention: Discovery of covert operations undermines American objectives.

Our second contention: The only way to prevent discovery is to end all operations; the only way to prevent discovery is to end all operations. Our first sub-point: Discovery of some operations is inevitable; discovery of some is inevitable. Officials in the field, allied operatives, and the American press have all leaked news of covert operations. And, of course, given the nature of our society with its freedom of speech and press, these sources cannot be silenced. That was the conclusion of President Kennedy quoted by Theodore Sorensen: Discovery of covert operations, he said, is inevitable in an open society.<sup>13</sup>

But communist counterintelligence also guarantees discovery. General Bedell

handful of people knew it at the time, the American government came very close to responding with a conditional decision to go to war with Red China.”

<sup>12</sup> Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations* (Chicago: 1964), p. 302: “This summary (and by no means complete) review of representative crises which have threatened the stability of the first thermonuclear decade serves to make one point clear: a major threat to the peace has come from covert operations set in motion by one side or the other.”

<sup>13</sup> Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York, 1965), p. 300. Sorensen reports the following regarding discovery of the covert operation involved in the air strike against Cuba in April of 1961: “The exile air arm, other than transports, was composed solely of lumbering B-26’s as part of the covert nature of the plan. These World War II vintage planes were possessed by so many nations, including Cuba, that American sponsorship would be difficult to prove, and the prelanding attack on Cuban airfields could thus be attributed to defecting Castro pilots. No Florida, Puerto Rico, or other bases nearer than Nicaragua were to be used for similar reasons. . . . The first air strike went off as planned early Saturday morning, April 15. But its effectiveness was limited by the attempt to pretend it was conducted by pilots deciding to defect that day from Castro. Only B-26’s were used, no American napalm was used, and the planes

Smith, the late director of the CIA, frankly admitted that any agency engaging in covert operations can safely assume that some of its activities will be penetrated and compromised by the enemy.<sup>14</sup> Some operations, therefore, will inevitably be discovered.

Of course, the fact that some will be discovered argues only for stricter control to abolish them. Our second sub-point explains why such control is impossible: There is no way to tell in advance which operations will be discovered; there is no way to tell in advance. History proves the point. Obviously no one would mount an operation knowing full well that it is going to be discovered. Yet time and again operations come to light with no consistent pattern of disclosure. They are discovered, large and small, at home and abroad, in success and failure. There is no singular characteristic triggering discovery which we can isolate and eliminate. So we cannot control operations to eliminate just the ones that are going to be discovered.

If we want to eliminate discovery, we must end all covert operations—good and bad. And the reason we should do so is our third contention: The harms of discovery outweigh the value of continuing all operations; the harms of discovery outweigh the value of continuing all operations. Now Joel and I realize the CIA has often done what it set out to do. It has overthrown governments and it has

had to fly from Nicaragua and return, except for one flown to Florida to act out the cover story. The cover story was even less successful than the air strike. It was quickly torn apart—which the President realized he should have known was inevitable in an open society—not only by Castro’s representatives but by a penetrating press.”

<sup>14</sup> Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion*, pp. 309-10: “When he was director of the CIA, the late General Bedell Smith frankly admitted that any intelligence agency, including CIA, could safely assume that some of its operations would be penetrated and compromised.”

fixed elections. But the critical question is, do these activities make any significant contribution to American foreign policy? Two experts, both of whom were associated with the CIA in official capacities, answer no. Turn to Professor Edwin Reischauer, President Kennedy's foreign policy adviser. In 1967 he wrote, "The sort of covert . . . activity . . . associated with the CIA is of value only in relatively weak . . . countries—and even then only for short range purposes."<sup>15</sup> Or turn to Roger Hilsman, former director of the Bureau of Intelligence. He wrote, ". . . covert action was really nothing more than a gimmick. In very special circumstances, it was a useful supplement, but nothing more."<sup>16</sup>

So continuing all operations would make an insignificant contribution to our foreign policy objectives. And yet our first contention indicates that discovery of covert operations significantly undermines those objectives. The conclusion is obvious. Professor Reischauer makes the final judgment: On balance, covert political activities carried out by the CIA are clearly a net loss, a net loss, to the United States.<sup>17</sup> For this reason he concludes, ". . . the CIA should not be engaged in political activities but should be limited to its original function of intelligence gathering."<sup>18</sup>

To that end, Joel and I propose the following plan: One, covert operations will be abolished; covert operations will be abolished. Two, a court will be es-

tablished to enforce this law; a court of enforcement. Three, participation in or direction of a covert operation will constitute an act of treason and will be punishable as such; participation or direction punishable as an act of treason.

"Still in all the people started to whisper to one another that what the child said was so. 'The Emperor doesn't have any clothes on. A little child is saying it and it is true.' The Emperor began to squirm, and all at once he knew that what the people said was right."<sup>19</sup> [applause]

#### *First Negative Constructive:*

Mike Miller, Houston

Frankly I wish I was debating Rich's mother. [laughter] However, I would like to direct your attention to the gentlemen's rationale for change. Before I do so, David has one question. He would like to know who is going to appoint this particular court or commission.

With this in mind, consider what the gentlemen from Harvard tell you. They tell you, first of all, that discovery of covert operations is detrimental. Now first, I would make the observation that the gentlemen haven't really defined "discovery" for us. What the gentlemen have shown is suspicion, and I would suggest that discovery in the radical term—that is, proving something about the CIA—is nearly impossible. Discovery is nearly impossible. We can turn to the CIA itself, a publication in 1961. It notes that ". . . the Central Intelligence Agency does not confirm or deny published reports, whether good or bad; never alibis; never explains its organization; never identifies its personnel . . . , and will not discuss its budget. . . ."<sup>20</sup> I would sug-

<sup>15</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia* (New York: 1967), p. 221.

<sup>16</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: 1967), p. 86.

<sup>17</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam*, p. 221: "Thus on balance such covert activities are, I feel, clearly a net loss to us abroad, and running counter as they do to our own concepts of morality, they probably do even more serious internal injury to us at home."

<sup>18</sup> Edwin O. Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam*, pp. 222-23.

<sup>19</sup> Hans Christian Andersen, "The Emperor's New Clothes."

<sup>20</sup> From a mimeographed pamphlet, "The Central Intelligence Agency," issued by the CIA, Spring, 1961, p. 7, as reported in: Harry

gest, first, that the gentlemen have little more than suspicion throughout the entirety of their examples. They claim that the communists say that the CIA was involved in certain plots to overthrow them. That's quite probable. They do not point out that the CIA admits that these people were operatives, and I think that is a major consideration.

With this in mind, consider what the gentleman tells you. He tells you, first, that we strengthen communism, and he gives you two examples of where we strengthen communism. I would suggest two basic things. First, look at both the gentleman's examples, Laos and Burma. I would suggest in neither state do we have a communist form of government. First, look at the case of Laos. The gentlemen admit that we have a tripartite government that is neutralist.

Secondly, look at Burma. I would suggest, number one, Burma is officially neutral. I would suggest, number two, that Burmese neutralism is favorable to the interests of the United States. Let's turn first to Mr. A. Doak Barnett on the Council on Foreign Relations in 1960. He notes, "Since late 1958,"—which I want you to remember is the same year as the supposed CIA operation—"a subtle change has been taking place in Burma's neutralism. While continuing to adhere to a policy of nonalignment, Burma's new military leaders . . . have steadily strengthened their ties with the West."<sup>21</sup> I would indicate as did Harold Hovey, former director of the Military Assistance Program, 1965, that ". . . United States military equipment" for example "has been provided to Burma under sales arrangements begun in 1958 and

renewed in 1961"<sup>22</sup> despite all the supposed strengthening of communism that took place in that particular state.

But the gentlemen then go back to Laos and indicate to you that there was a harm in Vietnam. Note the assumption that Harvard makes here. They assume because Laos now has a three-party government, the North Vietnamese are capable of infiltrating through Laos. Now I want the gentlemen to indicate to me in any shape, form, or fashion, that even a pro-United States government could police the entirety of the Laotian jungle and prevent that infiltration. The gentleman simply doesn't have a point here; it doesn't necessarily strengthen communism.

Number two, the gentlemen tell you that the National Student Association, for example, is an instance of where CIA operations involve unknowing persons. Note, number one, there is no way of knowing whether they should be involved or not, whether they actually undertook it or not, whether there was actually an operation or not. It is quite possible under this particular proposal for the Soviets or the Chinese or anyone else to claim that anyone in a particular country is involved with the CIA, and there is no way of denying it, either under the affirmative proposal or under the present system.

Consider, however, the National Student Association and student movements around the world. I would suggest that we do gain an advantage by subsidizing those particular movements and should maintain that option. Amaury de Riencourt, consultant to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, noted on page 111 of his 1968 book, *The American Empire*, "Often enough, the CIA assists the enemies of the United States' allies, and by

Howe Ransom, *Can American Democracy Survive Cold War?* (Garden City, N.Y.: 1963), p. 172.

<sup>21</sup> A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy* (New York: 1960), p. 323.

<sup>22</sup> Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices* (New York: 1965), p. 36.

doing it secretly, avoids antagonizing those allies while keeping all its options open for the future and undercutting Communist influence.”<sup>23</sup> He notes the involvement of students in anti-colonial type rebel movements. I would suggest that is a definite advantage, and I would suggest the advantages outweigh the losses in that particular point. I think I’m as qualified as Mr. Reischauer to make that particular judgment.

Number three, the gentlemen tell you that discovery of particular operations threatens the peace. Now note the example that the gentlemen give you. They give you the example of Formosa. Now note, the Chinese on the mainland and the Chinese on Formosa have been carrying on these particular operations—fighting against each other—since 1946. I don’t think the CIA created the enmity between Chiang and Mao. I indicate, number two, that we would require some utilization of intelligence research over Red China. And I indicate to you, number three, that it is quite probable that spies would be treated the same way as guerrillas. Note that the gentleman talks about the shellings. He in no way proves, number one, that CIA agents were actually involved. He in no way proves that Chiang Kai-shek couldn’t send guerrilla operations over there anyway, and the world still wouldn’t be pushed to war. I don’t think Harvard has a warrant in this particular contention.

But here the gentlemen present their most important contention. They tell you that, in order to prevent discovery, we must end all covert operations. And here the gentlemen tell you that operatives can be detected. And note what the

gentlemen say here. They say that operatives in this particular operation can be detected by similar operatives. Now the question arises in my mind, as I am sure it does in yours, exactly why we alienate everyone, exactly why we harm the innocent, exactly why we alienate these countries, when the Soviet Union does the same thing in the particular field. I think we need to maintain the option for that particular reason. Mr. Reincourt, previously cited, 1968: “Since it is difficult to fight an opponent without using his own best weapons, the Americans were quickly driven to duplicate, to a certain extent, the Soviet apparatus”<sup>24</sup> for conducting covert operations. I would suggest we need to counterbalance it. I would also suggest once again—and this is most important—that anyone can be called by anyone else an operative, and there is no way to disprove that even under Harvard’s proposal because it is not going to do much good to show a Soviet police agent a copy of the new law.

All right, now consider the third basic point. Here the gentlemen tell you—and I want you to note this, this is a subjective value judgment that the gentlemen make—they tell you that the harms of covert operations and the discovery of covert operations outweigh the gains. Let’s consider some of the gains. First of all, let’s consider a general trend. Now I think this is particularly important. Mr. Amaury de Riencourt, previously cited, in 1968: “. . . it is certain that an increasing number of covert operations are carried out with considerable success; past successes testify eloquently, although they are less publicized than the failures. . . .”<sup>25</sup> We are suggesting, therefore, that there is an increasing trend

<sup>23</sup> Amaury de Riencourt, *The American Empire* (New York: 1968), p. 111. Regarding student involvement, Riencourt notes: “Thousands of students fighting colonial regimes in Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and Southwest Africa, among many others, were and are subsidized secretly.”

<sup>24</sup> Amaury de Riencourt, *The American Empire*, p. 109.

<sup>25</sup> Amaury de Riencourt, *The American Empire*, p. 108.

for covert operations of the United States to be more effective. The gentlemen simply make that particular judgment on the basis of past failures. At no time does their authority or do the gentlemen from Harvard actually draw the correlation between the two. They say, here is the political value, here is the political loss. Harvard cannot make that particular moral judgment.

But just to show you that we are not short on moral judgments ourselves, I would suggest to you that we have an authority that's just as good as Mr. Reischauer who suggests to you that there is a reason, and that the actual costs-benefits ratio is in favor of the present system. Here we turn to Mr. Charles Jacobs, Professor of Political Science at Vassar, in 1966. He notes, "That the CIA has at times been mis- or uninformed is obvious, but this is a hazard common to all government agencies; to suggest that [the covert operations of] the CIA be abolished, or even closely scrutinized by the normal governmental agencies, is to deprive ourselves of an unpleasant necessity in the era of the cold war."<sup>26</sup> I suggest that Harvard makes this particular value judgment.

Now let me document some of the successes. We turn once again to Mr. Rencourt in 1968. He notes, in the case of Indonesia, that there is a distinct possibility that during the coup of 1965 the CIA had a distinct connection between the opponents of President Sukarno, forcing him to do what it wanted. Consider Rencourt's conclusion: It is plausible to assume that the CIA might have had a finger in the Indonesian pie when President Sukarno was overthrown in the 1965 military takeover; it is naive to assume that the CIA after attempts to overthrow Sukarno in 1958 and at other times, had nothing to do with the

coup.<sup>27</sup> I would suggest Indonesia is very important. The gentlemen tell you it's only small areas. Remember that Indonesia is one of the major areas in the Southeast Asian island chain, has all resources, etcetera, and was in danger of communist take-over.

Now look at our own hemisphere. I would suggest we have been successful here too. Turn to Mr. Amaury de Riencourt, previously cited: ". . . in 1962 and 1963, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees had turned its International Affairs Department over to the CIA to be used as a base for strikes and subversive activities aimed at the overthrow of Premier Cheddi Jagan's proto-Communist regime in British Guiana—which was duly accomplished . . . in . . . 1964, thus avoiding . . . a new Cuba"<sup>28</sup> in the Western Hemisphere.

The gentlemen give you examples; we give you examples. The gentlemen give you a conclusionary piece of evidence; we give you a conclusionary piece of evidence. The basic difference is that Harvard cannot guarantee that their particular harms will necessarily be met by the adoption of their proposal. We can guarantee some successes in the future. We can guarantee a probability that those successes will be good. We have to take the criticism either way. We suggest, therefore, the basis for United States

<sup>27</sup> Amaury de Riencourt, *The American Empire*, pp. 112-13: "It is highly probable that the CIA gets a great deal of credit for influence it does not have and operations it has never undertaken. But is it entirely fanciful to imagine that it might have had a finger in the Indonesian pie when President Sukarno was overthrown by the 1965 military takeover? After all—Sukarno was aware of it—the CIA had several times, notably in 1958, participated in attempts to overthrow him. Would it be naive to think that, when the overthrow was successfully carried out in 1965, wresting well over a hundred million people from the clutches of an impending Communist coup, the CIA had something to do with it?"

<sup>28</sup> Amaury de Riencourt, *The American Empire*, pp. 110-11.

<sup>26</sup> Charles E. Jacob, *Policy and Bureaucracy* (Princeton, N.J.: 1966), p. 172.



policy should be to gain the most advantage from covert operations, which are necessary, and that we can do with the present system. [applause]

*Second Affirmative Constructive:*

Joel Perwin, Harvard

Rich and I are pleased to be debating the affirmative today. In 1492 Columbus discovered America. Since 1947 the United States has been discovered again and again and again. [laughter] And because Rich and I don't want to see the United States running around naked, we resolve that executive control should be curtailed. The gentleman begins with a question: Who appoints the court? I hadn't thought of it. Perhaps the Supreme Court could do it. If Mike or Dave want to assume that perhaps the President would appoint them, they may do so.

Secondly, they suggest that discovery is impossible because there is no way in the world to tie these events we discussed with you to the Central Intelligence Agency. Let me indicate initially that all the examples which we use in the affirmative case have been admitted to by the former director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, in his book, *The Craft of Intelligence*.<sup>29</sup> We were careful to choose the examples in that way. Number two, we admit to Mike that there is a fine line between discovery and accusation. We think we can perhaps establish what that distinction is by demonstrating that unless an activity is proven to be associated with the CIA, it won't produce the harms which we have discussed with you. For example, in the NSA, Professor Hunt writes in 1968, "Actually, there were some ironies in the timing of this clamor. A year before, in April, 1966, the New York Times had published a three-part

series of articles on the CIA. Although these articles had systematically set forth the scope of CIA infiltration of private American institutions, they had produced no significant public reaction."<sup>30</sup> The public reaction came when it was proved conclusively that the United States was associated. It is a fine distinction, but I think we can make it.

Then the gentlemen deal specifically with the affirmative case, the first contention of which was that discovery of covert operations undermines American objectives, the first subpoint of which was that discovery strengthens communism in two ways through two examples. The gentleman responds by dealing first with Laos. He says that Laos is not communist today, but rather tri-communist—that is, only one-third of the country is communist. Now that is true, but we said the third of the country that is controlled by the communists is being used to supply and replenish the rebels in North Vietnam, and that is the harm. We suggest that that harm, or a result of a tripartite country, was the result of the CIA discovery. Note please that Mike does not reject that causal link. Therefore, we have established the harm for you.

Mike says, second, however, with respect to Laos: Prove to us that we could have controlled the area and prevented the infiltration. I think that is Mike's burden of proof. He has to show us that if we had allowed Souvana Phouma to keep control of the entire country, he could have prevented or not have prevented the Laotians from getting the strangle hold of the country that they have today. We have indicated that that problem was the direct result of the coup. If Mike rejects that indication, he has to prove it.

Second, with respect to Burma, Mike's

<sup>29</sup> Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: 1963).

<sup>30</sup> Richard M. Hunt, "The CIA Exposures," 213.

only analysis is to indicate to us that Burma is neutral today. I suppose that if we could prove to you that Japan bombed Pearl Harbor because of a covert operation—which admittedly we can't—Mike would get up and say, that is no problem because Japan is our ally today. The point is that in the short run it was disastrous. We demonstrated from our evidence in the first speech that nothing so strengthened the communists as the CIA fiasco. The gentlemen tell us that the reason the CIA goes into these areas is to preclude a communist takeover, then turn around and tell us that there is nothing wrong with a communist takeover or with communist inclinations. We suggest they are being inconsistent.

But let me add a final example to the examples we have given you. We suggest we strengthened communism in 1961 because of the Bay of Pigs invasion. H. Bradford Westerfield of Yale writes, "Communism simply tightened its grip in Cuba, if not Indonesia, after the local government's victory over the United States in sublimated war."<sup>31</sup> We suggest we strengthened communism.

Two, we injure the innocent. Note please that Mike does not deny the significance of the harm. He implicitly or tacitly admits to you that it is harmful to undermine careers, etcetera, and it is harmful to throw scores of people into jail for nine years of hard labor in East Berlin. He admits, then, the significance of the affirmative harm. He says two things. One, he repeats his analysis that the CIA might not have been involved. I have already demonstrated Dulles admits to it. But, number two, he suggests perhaps we got an advantage. He doesn't tell us how, and reads no evidence. Let me turn first to Professor Hunt. He writes that the CIA was "debilitating the per-

sonal and institutional standards in America for the sake of a dubious advantage abroad."<sup>32</sup> Senator J. William Fulbright tells us how dubious that advantage was: "... international youth congresses and festivals are not nearly so important as the N.S.A. and its C.I.A. benefactors have thought. Since it has always been unlikely that either Russian Communists or American democrats could convert the other, presumably the importance of these meetings has been ... to sway the minds of the uncommitted ... " which "... would have had to be fairly feeble"—that's Fulbright's language—"to be permanently won over to one ideology or the other by flattery, oratory and hoopla ... " <sup>33</sup> characterized by the CIA. We don't think we got any advantage, and we challenge Mike to prove it. He does not deny the harm that we do injure people.

Let me add another example. The gentleman tells us about British Guiana; we injured innocents there. According to Richard J. Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies, "Mobs roamed the streets ... attacking people of Indian ancestry. At least fifty people were injured ... " and others were killed; "... the violence was instigated by a terrorist group" financed by the CIA.<sup>34</sup> We suggest it is

<sup>32</sup> Richard M. Hunt, "The CIA Exposures," pp. 215-16: "If America really was a free and democratic country, what was the morality that permitted the CIA to set up a clandestine network of front funds, 'pass through' conduits, and tacitly co-operating foundations? What were the ethics in debilitating the personal and institutional standards in America for the sake of a dubious advantage abroad?"

<sup>33</sup> J. W. Fulbright, "We Must Not Fight Fire with Fire," *New York Times Magazine* (April 23, 1967), 127.

<sup>34</sup> Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: 1968), p. 242: "According to a secret report of the British police superintendent in British Guiana to the British commissioner, written on September 11, 1963, which came to light in a debate in the House of Commons in 1966, the violence was instigated by a terrorist group which included British agents. The document states that O'Keefe, the CIA agent, fi-

<sup>31</sup> H. Bradford Westerfield, *The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy* (New York: 1963), p. 451.

harmful when we injure innocent people.

Third, we threaten the peace. The gentleman does not deny the conclusion from Professor Blackstock that the discovery of covert operations in general threatens the peace. We think that monstrosity significant. With respect to the one example of Formosa, Mike has three responses. He says, number one, we have always been defending Formosa. But we never came to the brink of war as we did except for the CIA coup. The gentleman is not responsive to our harm. Number two, he suggests to you that perhaps by catching spies we can threaten the peace. I would like the gentleman to prove that to you, prove that discovery of intelligence operatives would threaten nuclear or total war. I don't think Mike can prove that. And finally the gentleman says, look, Chiang would probably have attacked China anyway. That in no way indicates that we would have drawn the United States into the conflict. We indicate a power struggle between Communist China and the United States, Mike's assertion notwithstanding.

Let me add another example to this one, the Bay of Pigs. James Reston writes in November, 1964, ". . . Kennedy said just enough . . . to convince me . . ." that Khrushchev had studied the Bay of Pigs fiasco and had decided on that basis that "he was dealing with an inexperienced young leader who could be intimidated and blackmailed. The Communist decision to put offensive missiles into Cuba was the final gamble of this assumption."<sup>35</sup> The Bay of Pigs brought us

nanced these operations through 'monetary transactions' with Ishmael."

<sup>35</sup> James Reston, "What Was Killed Was not Only the President but the Promise," *New York Times Magazine* (November 15, 1964), 126: "We will have to know much more about that confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, one now deprived of life and the other of power, before we can be sure, but Kennedy said just enough in that room in the Embassy to convince me of the following: Khrushchev had studied the events of the Bay of Pigs;

to the brink of thermonuclear disaster. That supports the conclusion of Professor Blackstock: Covert operations are detrimental. Their discovery threatens the peace.

Second, the only way to prevent discovery is to end all operations. Mike does not deny the contention. He makes two arguments, but neither of them deny the contention. And the contention is crucial. It says that we cannot just keep the good examples that Mike told us about—Indonesia and British Guiana—but we have to keep the bad ones too. Therefore, we have to make the value judgment, and that's our third contention. What two points did Mike make?

First of all, he suggests, why would we harm ourselves when the Soviets are not harming themselves, and don't we need counterintelligence, etcetera. First, discovery of Soviet operations doesn't harm them because they are not supposed to be an open society and we expect them to do such things. We are harmed by the very nature of American society according to President Kennedy whom we quoted in the first speech. But, number two, we suggest we can counter the Soviets, and there is a better way to do it than covert operations. That was the conclusion of former Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland in 1961: "The best answer"—underline the word best—"to the stealthy Soviet practice of indirect aggression is . . . not reciprocal stealth but the highlight of publicity."<sup>36</sup> If the Soviets are doing anything, we need only expose them. The gentleman in no way indicates we are harming a precious ally.

Second, the gentleman suggests that

he would have understood if Kennedy had left Castro alone or destroyed him; but when Kennedy was rash enough to strike at Cuba but not bold enough to finish the job, Khrushchev decided that he was dealing with an inexperienced young leader who could be intimidated and blackmailed."

<sup>36</sup> "America's New Spy Master," *The Economist* (October 28, 1961), 336.

claims or allegations can cause the same problems. I think he had better prove that. I would like them to show us that claims can threaten the peace, strengthen the communists, and injure the innocent. We give you the example of the National Student Association in which a year before the discovery, the *New York Times* made many claims, but nothing came of it. Only the proof that the CIA was involved can cause the harms which we discussed. Mike is in no way responsive to that position.

Third, the harms of discovery outweigh the value of continuing all operations. Mike makes three points. Number one, he suggests to you that the number of successes is increasing, never telling you why. Let me read general evidence, first about the purpose of our interventions and second about their success. The purpose, of course, is to preclude a communist takeover, yet Professor Paul Blackstock of Chicago writes in 1964, "The perennial struggle against Soviet Communist or other revolutionary movements will not be won by covert operations which seek, however successfully, to do no more than thwart threatened seizures of power, or merely to overthrow a Communist regime. . . ." <sup>37</sup> We can't stop communism. What about the successes? Richard Cottam of Pittsburgh writes, ". . . the evidence in these cases suggests that the element of good luck was extraordinarily important." <sup>38</sup> We suggest we can't guarantee success. Number three, Fred Cook writes in *Nation* that all of the CIA successes dealt with intelligence, and intelligence alone. <sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion*, p. 289.

<sup>38</sup> Richard W. Cottam: *Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy* (Pittsburgh: 1967), p. 216.

<sup>39</sup> Fred J. Cook, "The CIA," 532: "Though the U-2 program became, in its catastrophic finale, a fulcrum of policy, the significant pattern that emerges from the Berlin wire-tapping, the smuggling of the Khrushchev speech, the

There was no unique benefit to covert operations.

Now Mike then gives us three arguments. First, he quotes Mr. Jacobs who simply says that we need to keep the CIA. Mr. Jacobs does not make the value judgment. He is only saying that he thinks—and he is a professor, not an expert who is associated in any official capacity with the CIA—that covert operations are valuable. We have denied that allegation. The only source in today's debate who indicates that the harms outweigh the benefits or who makes a judgment on that value is Professor Reischauer. He is associated with the CIA, and he makes the evaluation.

But Mike gives us two examples of successes. Number one, we helped in Indonesia. We turn to Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff of the Hudson Institute writing in 1966: "In the late 1950's . . . the United States supported an unsuccessful rebellion in Indonesia against President Sukarno, and the effect was to provide gratuitous grounds for anti-American sentiments and pro-communist political policies in Indonesia for years following." <sup>40</sup> We suggest it was harmful. But Mike is suggesting that the CIA had something to do with the recent attempt, the coup in Indonesia in 1968. I suggest he prove it, and demonstrate to us what the value was, and demonstrate to us that these people couldn't have succeeded in the coup without the CIA.

Then he suggests British Guiana, never telling us there is a threat. Professor Barnett writes, "Although a Marxist in outlook, he [Jagan] made no move to become part of the Soviet orbit." <sup>41</sup> There was no threat. Mike suggests perhaps it

years-long earlier successes of the U-2, seem fairly obvious. All dealt with intelligence—and intelligence only."

<sup>40</sup> Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, *Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy* (New York: 1966), p. 151.

<sup>41</sup> Richard J. Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution*, p. 239.

was becoming another Cuba. I like the language because Barnet uses it too: There is no “. . . evidence that Jagan was about to make a ‘Cuba’ of his country.”<sup>42</sup> Finally, why was Arbenz leaning toward the communists? According to Barnet, “Just as Arbenz [in Guatemala] nine years earlier had under pressure turned increasingly to the Soviet bloc, so Jagan now tried to get assistance from the only governments willing to defy the United States.”<sup>43</sup> There was no threat in British Guiana. Rather there were riots that killed and injured people.

I don't think the gentlemen can establish the value of the CIA. [applause]

*Second Negative Constructive:*

David Seikel, Houston

I would like to direct your attention to the affirmative proposal. Consider first the gentlemen's analysis has been restricted solely to the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet their plan completely prohibits all covert operations. Apparently they are implying that some other agency engages in such activities, yet they completely failed to indict any activities other than those suspected of the Central Intelligence Agency. As D. F. Fleming, Professor of International Relations at Vanderbilt, points out in 1968, “Since the Bay of Pigs fiasco the actual handling of subversive *operations* appear to have been transferred to the Defense Department, which may, for example, develop ‘guerrilla forces within a Communist

state.’”<sup>44</sup> Note that the gentlemen's analysis has considered only those instances in the Central Intelligence Agency. They haven't considered those by other functionaries.

Secondly, the gentlemen's analysis is by no means unique to executive control. And I would like to stress the point, that is, that their analysis indicts a policy of executing covert operations. They don't indict executive control of covert operations. Hence, I would suggest that their particular analysis is outside the purview of this particular resolution.

Thirdly, and I think this is crucial, the gentlemen have never proven themselves that the harms that they have claimed are inherent exclusively to covert operations. Now they say obviously they couldn't come from spying, but they don't ever prove their inherent burden of proof to show that their harms derive only from the covert operations, the tampering aspect of such functions.

Consider, first of all, the strengthening of communism. I would suggest that whether or not we conduct covert operations, that we are going to be blamed for them anyway and the propaganda value which correspondingly supposedly results in the strengthening of communism can continue to remain. Turn first to Lyman Kirkpatrick, former director of the CIA, in 1968: “. . . even if the United States and the CIA did not engage in any such activity, it would still be blamed for it by the Communists. There is validity to this. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio at his trial in 1966 admitted that he used the CIA as a scapegoat for most of the ills of his country.”<sup>45</sup> Secondly, consider the

<sup>42</sup> Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution*, p. 239: “Despite the visits of trade missions from the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and Hungary, a contract with Cuba for rice at an advantageous price, and Castro's offer of thirty-five million dollars in loans (which the British refused to let Jagan accept), the Kennedy administration had no hard evidence that Jagan was about to make a ‘Cuba’ of his country.”

<sup>43</sup> Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution*, p. 242.

<sup>44</sup> D. F. Fleming, “Can Pax Americana Succeed?” in *Struggle Against History: U.S. Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolution*, Ed., Neal D. Houghton (New York: 1968), p. 278.

<sup>45</sup> Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, *The Real CIA* (New York: 1968), p. 290.

*New York Times* study of the CIA in 1966: "Through spurious reports, gossip, misunderstandings, deep-seated fears and forgeries and falsifications, the Agency has been accused of almost anything anyone wanted to accuse it of."<sup>46</sup> They list the following: "Plotting the assassination of Jawaharlal Nehru, of India. Provoking the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Engineering the 'plot' that became the pretext for the murder of the leading Indonesian generals last year. Supporting the rightist army plots in Algeria. Murdering Patrice Lumumba in the Congo. Kidnaping Moroccan agents in Paris. Plotting the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah, of Ghana."<sup>47</sup> The point being they can accuse the Central Intelligence Agency of doing just about anything. It is still going to exist. It will still be engaging in those intelligence operations. I want the gentlemen to explain why they continue to supposedly encourage communism. They have given us no analysis.

Secondly, consider that simply terminating operations in the present doesn't necessarily alleviate the harm. Consider the gentlemen's example of Burma. Turn to the *New York Times* study once again: "Moreover, some of the Nationalist Chinese are still in northern Burma, years later, and still fomenting trouble and infuriating governments in that area, although they have not been supported by the CIA or any American agency for a decade."<sup>48</sup> Now gentlemen, I assume we are carrying on a lot of operations today. Suppose we stop our support for them. In Burma we stopped the support, but their harms supposedly continued after we were no longer engaging

in them. They can't guarantee solution of their harm simply by terminating current operations.

Consider next the supposed harm to innocents. And I would like to know exactly why, if the Central Intelligence Agency goes into a country, bribes innocent people and helps them engage in spying, that they too can't be sentenced to life in some communist prison camp or something else. The gentlemen make a dichotomous assumption, that there is a difference between covert operations and spying in the minds of the people who persecute those innocents, yet they never justify that supposed assumption. I would like to know why communist governments are going to punish people engaged in covert operations who are innocent but they aren't going to punish people who are engaged in such things as spying. The gentlemen have never given us the reasoning.

Next, consider threats to the peace. The gentlemen say, obviously spies can't threaten the peace. Once again, no reasoning why that inherent assumption is valid. Consider the following scenario in the 1961 situation in the U-2 overflight. Isn't it possible that that which was a spying mission could have resulted in a nuclear war? A miscalculation of Soviet radars supposedly according to their possibility justification could have led them to believe they were under some form of attack. In other words, the act of spying itself could be considered by the Soviet Union or a communist government to be a threat to its security and hence a threat to the peace.

But I want to stress the over-all line of analysis, that is that the gentlemen have given us no reason to assume that their inherent assumption is correct—that there is a difference, or that it would be perceived as such a difference. Consider the next argument. That is that it is impossible to separate intelligence from opera-

<sup>46</sup> *Congressional Record*, Vol. 112, Part 8 (May 3, 1966), p. 9568; from *New York Times* of April 26, 1966.

<sup>47</sup> *Congressional Record* (May 3, 1966), p. 9568; from *New York Times* of April 25, 1966.

<sup>48</sup> *Congressional Record* (May 3, 1966), p. 9568; from *New York Times* of April 25, 1966.

tions. Now the gentlemen said that we should let the Central Intelligence Agency do that which it is best at and that which it is designed for, the gathering of intelligence. I would maintain, however, that it is impossible to distinguish between covert operations and the gathering of intelligence on a practical basis. Consider the *New York Times* study in 1966: "For information-gathering often spills over at the scene of action into something else—subversion, counteractivity, sabotage, political and economic intervention and other kinds of 'dirty tricks.' Often the intelligence gathered, by design or force of circumstance, becomes an activist in these affairs he was sent to watch."<sup>49</sup> They conclude, "In these and dozens of other instances, an agent who is merely ostensibly gathering intelligence is in reality an activist attempting to create or resolve a situation."<sup>50</sup> Now the gentlemen assume that you can take the two and separate them; their own *New York Times* study indicates that you can't.

Now the question becomes, is this on-the-spot intelligence vital to the over-all intelligence network? Granted, most of our intelligence comes from open sources. Yet to be made meaningful, it requires this on-the-spot activist influence to make the meaningful interpretation possible. We turn to the *New York Times* study for their conclusion: "Four of every five of these items, it is said, now come either from open sources or inanimate devices. But in many important instances it is still the human agent, alerted to make a particular arrangement or to chase a specific piece of information, who provides the link that makes all else meaningful and significant; sometimes, now as in the 18th century, it is men alone

who do the job in danger and in difficulty."<sup>51</sup> I would suggest, then, that there is no assurance that you can practically separate the two functions.

Next, I would like to suggest that if we accept the gentlemen's analysis, consider the likely result. Now they make an assumption, that the United States wants to interfere in other states. We have an interest in doing so because apparently that is why we try to accomplish these goals using covert operations. If the gentlemen deny covert operations to the policy makers, they do nothing about the motivation of the desire to interfere in other states, and I suggest the logical recourse is the use of overt intervention. They say, let's not respond through stealth. What is the likely result going to be? Response through an overt intervention, which is on the whole worse. Consider as did Stanley Hoffmann, Professor of Government, Harvard, in 1968: "The less overt the American intervention and the more tenuous the link between the revolutionaries . . . and the United States, the more lasting the success of offense or compellence will be (the forces that brought it off will appear genuinely national). . . ."<sup>52</sup> Consider as did H. B. Westerfield, Professor of Political Science at Yale, in 1963: ". . . outright military intervention is vastly more repugnant to articulate opinion in most parts of the world than are the other techniques for manipulating politics abroad."<sup>53</sup> Consider their specific analysis—threats to innocents, threats to the peace. If the United States can't send a few covert operatives in and we have to send a full-scale military intervention in, that is going to harm innocent people

<sup>49</sup> *Congressional Record* (May 3, 1966), p. 9573; from *New York Times* of April 27, 1966.

<sup>50</sup> *Congressional Record* (May 3, 1966), p. 9573; from *New York Times* of April 27, 1966.

<sup>51</sup> *Congressional Record* (May 3, 1966), p. 9572; from *New York Times* of April 27, 1966.

<sup>52</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: 1968), p. 82.

<sup>53</sup> H. Bradford Westerfield, *The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy*, p. 450.

and threaten the peace far more than the simple covert operation. Consider Vietnam. There we kill innocents by bombing them; it isn't of the the same magnitude as a covert operation. Consider the threat to peace. We have actual military forces engaged in an overt intervention; we don't simply have covert operatives as occurs in the present system.

Consider now the gentlemen's analysis on the option of covert interventions. Here I would suggest that they have a fundamental fallacy. Notice, unless we can tell every single operation of a covert nature that the CIA has conducted and examine it, we can't make this value judgment. What the gentlemen did is say, well, we realize you can't do that so let's go to the people involved in the covert operations themselves. They never proved Mr. Reischauer actually was on that CIA board; they never proved that Mr. Reischauer was connected with the Central Intelligence Agency. Sure, he was connected with foreign policy. They didn't demonstrate that he knew about every single one of those covert operations and could make that authoritative value judgment. So, it becomes a question of evaluating the authorities that they did present. Let's start with Mr. Hilsman, 1964: "Dulles justifies our covert political activities on similar grounds. As long as the Communist countries continue to use subversive means to bring down non-Communist regimes, those who oppose the Communists must be prepared to meet the threat. But meeting it successfully, Dulles argues, means that our intelligence services must play their role early in the struggle, while the subversion is still in the plotting and organizational stage."<sup>54</sup> Mr. Dulles seems to think that on balance we ought to keep those covert operations.

But let's read Mr. Hilsman's conclusion

—the affirmative's own source: "In both these arguments, it seems to me, Dulles is fundamentally right. So long as the Communists themselves are openly antagonistic to the rest of the world, as they openly and avowedly are, and so long as they use the techniques of subversion to bring down governments, which they do and which they openly and avowedly advocate doing, . . ." he suggests we should retain that covert operation potential.<sup>55</sup> That's the point. We can turn for further support to another man intimately connected with the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, in 1968: "There is little question that the United States government needs a capability for covert action to fight its enemies."<sup>56</sup> I suggest then, thirdly, turning to Mr. H. H. Ransom, Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt, who concluded in 1964. ". . .our new world position demands an instrument for counter-intelligence and secret political action overseas. . . ."<sup>57</sup>

In conclusion, then, I don't think the gentlemen have really given a significant harm. The harms they have given have not been demonstrated to be inherent solely in covert operations; they also accrue from intelligence, or potentially could accrue. Thirdly and finally, they have never assured us that the harms which they supposedly would eliminate

<sup>54</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 85. The complete sentence reads as follows: "So long as the Communists themselves are openly antagonistic to the rest of the world, as they openly and avowedly are, and as long as they use the techniques of subversion to bring down governments, which they do and which they openly and avowedly advocate doing, then the countries to which they are so hostile have both a right and a duty to use the methods of secret intelligence to protect and defend themselves—where those methods are effective and appropriate and for which there is no effective and appropriate alternative."

<sup>56</sup> Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, *The Real CIA*, pp. 289-90.

<sup>57</sup> Harry Howe Ransom, *Can American Democracy Survive Cold War?* p. 176.

<sup>54</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 84.



with their plan would not be outweighed by the substitution of another foreign policy tool upon its acceptance. [applause]

*First Negative Rebuttal:*

Mike Miller, Houston

I would like to return your attention to the gentlemen's affirmative. First of all, they tell you that the discovery of covert operations is harmful. I argue that the discovery *de facto* is impossible, but the accusations cause the same problems. Here the gentleman posits two arguments. He says, first, all his examples were referred to by Allen Dulles. I suggest the gentleman read absolutely nothing from Allen Dulles; that is merely an assertion on his part. Secondly, if he is accepting Mr. Dulles, he ought to accept Mr. Dulles' value judgment about the CIA because I know he is connected.

All right, now consider the second argument. The gentleman says there is a fine line between the threat of involvement of the CIA or the imagined involvement of the CIA and the actual CIA operation. I suggest that such is not the case. The mere threat or the imaginary presence of the CIA can cause every harm that the gentleman talked about. They challenged me for an example; here comes a "big goodie." [laughter] Amaury de Riencourt, consultant to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, in 1968, noted that "... the mere threat, real or imaginary, of CIA underground action in the Middle East, and the actualization of the military coup in Greece, was enough to influence the overheated imagination of the Egyptian leaders in Cairo"<sup>58</sup> with the result of the Six Day War in 1967. The imaginary involvement of the CIA has all the same harms as the gentleman's example.

<sup>58</sup> Amaury de Riencourt, *The American Empire*, p. 114.

Consider now the gentleman's contentions. They tell you, number one, that our particular CIA policy strengthens communism. Now look first at both examples. Neither in Laos nor in Burma do we have a communist government. In Laos they claim that a third of the country belongs to the communists. No, a third of the government belongs to the communists, and a third of the government belongs to us. According to Mr. Arthur J. Dommen, *Conflict in Laos*, 1964: General Phoumi, a member of the tripartite committee, is indeed in sympathy with reforms, a sympathy that is encouraged by the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>59</sup> The other part is neutral. And finally the gentlemen contend that we have to prove that they can stop that particular infiltration in Laos. They can't; they have their own problems, and the CIA has nothing to do with it. I would suggest, first, as does Mr. Richard Butwell, Professor of International Relations at American University, "Without American military help, in the form of equipment, training, advisers, and bombing, Laos probably would not exist as an independent state today."<sup>60</sup> They have got enough problems of their own without patrolling the borders looking for more North Vietnamese. The gentlemen can't carry that particular harm.

Number two, Burma. The gentleman has one response. He said it was short-term. I turn to Mr. Barnett. He said, "Since . . . 1958 . . ."<sup>61</sup>—that's the same

<sup>59</sup> Arthur J. Dommen, *Conflict in Laos* (New York: 1964), p. 127: "Like the other four generals involved in the attempted putsch of December, 1959, General Phoumi was in deep sympathy with the reforms advocated by the CDNI, a sympathy that appears to have been encouraged by his contact with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency."

<sup>60</sup> Richard Butwell, "Southeast Asia: A Survey," Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series*, No. 192 (December, 1968), 15.

<sup>61</sup> The reference is to the quotation is Barnett, *Communist China and Asia*, in the first negative constructive speech. See footnote 21.

year; it must have been a pretty short-term. I don't think the gentlemen really shows any significant harm.

Thirdly, he brings us a new example, the Bay of Pigs, and here he tells you the Bay of Pigs carried a threat of war. I suggest it did, but not necessarily because it was a covert operation, but because it wasn't enough of a covert operation. Norman A. Bailey, Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies, 1966: "The evidence indicates that the Soviet Union, while delighted at the embarrassment it [Cuba] was causing the United States, did not expect to retain its new client . . ." <sup>62</sup> until the Kennedy Administration failed to support the Bay of Pigs intervention. This convinced the Soviets they could use it for international purposes, not necessarily just the use of covert information.

All right, consider now the second point. The gentlemen tell you that it injures the innocent. Here, first of all, they say that Dulles admits it—I didn't hear it. Secondly, the gentleman tells you that the CIA gains are dubious. Now, recall the information on that from Mr. Riencourt. It said we were subsidizing anticolonials, but at the same time we were not engaging in any activities which our allies could perceive and hate us. We are getting the best of both worlds, and the gentleman doesn't deny it. He again reads a conclusionary piece of evidence. However, he says, during the coup that took place in British Guiana, some people were killed. So what? The gentleman doesn't prove that the coup wouldn't have taken place anyway; he doesn't prove that the CIA was in actually killing those people just to stir up some trouble. I don't think the gentleman really carries the argument.

Thirdly, the gentlemen tell you that we threaten the peace. He has one ex-

ample besides the Bays of Pigs, which I have already dealt with, and that is the example of Formosa. And I suggest in the example of Formosa we did not have the risk of nuclear war. Seyom Brown of U.C.L.A. concludes with me in 1968, ". . . we easily faced down the Chinese Communists during the first Quemoy-Matsu crisis . . . without running any high risks." <sup>63</sup> But note, secondly, the stimulating factor was guerrilla attacks by Chiang Kai-shek. Now we have been telling Chiang Kai-shek to get off the Chinese backs for the last ten years and he won't do it. That crisis still would have come about without the CIA, and the gentlemen don't deny that crucial line of argument.

Consider now the second contention, that to prevent discovery you have to end all CIA operations. They talk about value judgments. The first thing they say is we shouldn't do it because we have an open society. Now really, if the gentlemen are concerned about people dying, I think we ought to counterbalance those communist terrorist tactics. And so does Roger Hilsman, Columbia, 1964: ". . . the governments to which they are so hostile have both a right and a duty to use the methods of secret intelligence to protect and defend themselves. . . ." <sup>64</sup> The gentleman then says we ought to expose their stealth. Now wait a minute; we can scream "commie" all day long. Who is going to believe us? The gentlemen never qualify that particular point. We can counter their stealth with more stealth and be effective.

Thirdly, the gentlemen tell you that there are harms to discovery and they outweigh the risks. Recall I gave you the example of Indonesia. The gentleman

<sup>62</sup> Norman A. Bailey, *Latin America in World Politics* (New York, 1967), p. 100.

<sup>63</sup> Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson* (New York: 1968), p. 367.

<sup>64</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 85.

wants to know the importance of Indonesia. It contains thirty percent of the mineral resources that we utilized in the Second World War. The gentleman wants to know if that was the coup of 1965. It was; I have read him the evidence.<sup>65</sup> On balance, the conclusion of those involved with the CIA is in favor of its retention. [applause]

*First Affirmative Rebuttal:*

Richard Lewis, Harvard

In overtime, Michael got back to his two examples of successful covert operations. Indonesia: He reads us evidence very hurriedly that does not answer Joel's point—number one, that we are unsuccessful; number two, that we tighten the communist grip. Second, in British Guiana, Joel said the man was not a Soviet, it was not going to become another Cuba, and we drove him to the communists. This is crucial. If the gentlemen are going to make a value judgment, there has got to be something for them to put on their side of the scale. That was all they had going into rebuttal, and Mike dropped it in his speech.

Now observe the plan objections. Number one, that we don't indict anybody but the Central Intelligence Agency. That is not true; we indict all covert operations—our second and third contentions apply to them.

Second, we don't indict executive control. Of course we do. The executive authorizes covert operations; if we stop him from that authorization, we have reduced his control.

Thirdly, we never proved the harms unique to covert operations. That is true. We tell you one very simple thing. There are harms in covert operations and no countervailing benefits. The gentleman

doesn't respond to that. Then he goes through our four harms, stops at accusation, and said that Subandrio accused us in the Middle East. We asked him what was the harm to that. The gentleman doesn't tell us. Then we point to the NSA example. The gentleman doesn't respond to it. Then he talks about Burma, and he says the Chinese are still there. Obviously Joel and I can't solve the problems we have talked about. Those harms have already occurred. We are going to prevent future situations. Secondly, the gentleman talks about harming the innocent, and completely asserts to you that spying can cause the same harms. The gentleman never gives us an example. Also, however, if the gentleman is right and spying can cause the same harms, he doesn't make the value judgment. Intelligence is crucial to the United States. Therefore, if there are harms to intelligence gathering, they are worth it. We should incur the harms. We should not incur the harms in covert operations because there is nothing to balance them, there are not any benefits. The gentleman doesn't make the value judgment with respect to intelligence.

Fourth, the gentleman said we will threaten the peace, then gives a scenario using the U-2. It's an absolute assertion with absolutely no evidence indicating it might be true.

Fifth, the gentleman says you can separate intelligence from operations and makes two arguments. First, they often spill over. They spill over because covert operations are legal. If they are illegal and he can be punished for treason, we suggest the operative won't let it spill over. Mike doesn't deal with that. Second, he says information gathering covert operations are vital. That is not true. Professor Harry Howe Ransom says, ". . . operational commanders notoriously come to view the plan as an end

<sup>65</sup> The reference is to the quotation in Riencourt, *The American Empire*, in the first negative constructive speech. See footnote 27.

in itself."<sup>66</sup> A distorted view of reality always results. The information we get from covert operations is distorted; it is not useful information. Dave doesn't deal with that. Then he says we are going to intervene overtly. Look, why does the United States intervene covertly? Because we are afraid, if we are discovered, something disastrous is going to happen. That can be the only rationale for being "sneaky." Now, Dave is telling us Kennedy would have invaded the Bay of Pigs, we would have announced that we were supplying the Chinese in Burma, we would have announced that we were infiltrating the NSA. Covert and overt are not interchangeable, and Dave never suggested that they were.

To the top of the flow sheet where Mike makes two arguments. One, he says our "thing" about Dulles is an assertion. It is not; all the examples are documented in Dulles's book. Number two, he said if you accept Mr. Dulles there, you've got to accept his value judgment. No, we will accept what he said he does; we won't claim that what he said he does is beneficial because it was not.

Then Mike once again says, look at their examples in strengthening communism. Only one-third of Laos is under communist control. But that is the one-third that has been supplying North Vietnam. Two, he says the U.S. is also supporting the Laotians and they couldn't stop it. Yes, they could. What we are saying here is because they are in firm control of the country they have access to all the supplies in the country and they are being shipped directly into North Vietnam. The gentleman doesn't deny the harm. Second, on Burma. He said it was short-term. We say, yes it was, but it was harmful. We were trying to

stop communism and we've promoted it. What was the value of Burma? The gentleman doesn't tell us. What was the harm? We were counterproductive in our objectives. Third, on the Bay of Pigs, he said it didn't cause war. All right, we admit it didn't cause war. We said it strengthened Castro, and Mike doesn't deal with that.

Harming the innocent: He said British Guiana wasn't caused by the CIA. Do you recall Joel's evidence that terrorism, supported by the CIA, sparked riots?<sup>67</sup> The link did exist, and British Guiana was of no value.

Threatening the peace: He said in Formosa we faced down the Chinese. We certainly did. We said to the Chinese, we're going to blow you up if you don't back down. If the Chinese had not backed down, we would have blown them up, and they would have blown up a significant part of us too. The covert operation did nothing but threaten war. Second, he said we would still have had the crisis. That's true, but the US would not have been involved. Therefore, there couldn't have been the threat of war. Mike does not deal with the analysis. He says we must counter the communists. We say, let's expose them. Mike asserts it won't work. Recall the evidence that we read. Finally, he said Mr. Hilsman comes out in favor of the negative. Mr. Hilsman does not: ". . . covert action was really nothing more than a gimmick."<sup>68</sup> Joel and I don't think we should perpetuate gimmicks.

In the last five minutes of his career, I think Mr. Seikel has a lot of questions to answer. And if he does not, I think we should abolish covert operations. [applause]

<sup>66</sup> Harry Howe Ransom, "Secret Mission in an Open Society," in *An American Foreign Policy Reader*, Ed., H. H. Ransom (New York: 1965), p. 524.

<sup>67</sup> The reference is to the quotation in Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution*, in the second affirmative constructive speech. See footnote 34.

<sup>68</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 86.

*Second Negative Rebuttal:*

David Seikel, Houston

I would like to try my best to live up to Rich's expectations. First, concerning discovery, we turn first of all and examine their analysis of Mr. Dulles. We said they assert that Dulles documents all those examples. The gentleman repeats his assertion, never demonstrating the point. But get this: They are willing to accept Dulles's testimony on what he does, but not whether or not it works. I would like them to justify that position. The dichotomy has never been proven.

Next, consider the crucial issue that Mike pointed out that was never even considered in the first rebuttal, that being the mere imaginary threat of CIA action sparked the war in Israel and Egypt last year. The gentlemen never really denied that analysis. He simply overlooked it. I claim a definite harm which can result simply from that imagined involvement a crucial issue.

Consider next that it undermines objectives; first of all, strengthening of communism. Now note the most important thing. In none of those areas in which we used a covert operation did a communist government result. Consider Laos. The gentlemen say, now wait a minute, they are actually controlling this country and actually providing for this infiltration. Two points: Number one, the reason they can't stop it is because of over-all indigenous problems which the gentlemen don't deny. Most importantly, it is not the Laotians who are doing the shipping as Rich pointed out, but rather the North Vietnamese who are using it as a circular route into South Vietnam, something that was never denied. Consider in Burma that we have had those better relations since 1958, and the gentleman does not extend on that example.

Concerning the Bay of Pigs, they admit we had no real threat of nuclear war

since it never materialized. But the important issue is this: If we had used a little more force in that covert operation, if we had backed it a little more, we could have succeeded and they wouldn't have considered us to be weaklings in that situation and wouldn't have put those missiles in Cuba—analysis the gentlemen don't counter. Consider Mr. Riencourt's testimony unanswered.

Now we come to Guiana. The gentlemen claim that in Indonesia that coup could have taken place anyway. Well, then, that same terrorism and coup could have taken place anyway in Guiana, if you accept that reasoning. I suggest an inconsistency.

Next, on Formosa. The gentlemen said we threatened to blow the Chinese up, and that is why they backed down. If they hadn't backed down, they would have blown us up. Number one, he asserts that we threatened to use nuclear weapons in that situation against China. But the important consideration is what could China have done? They didn't have any nuclear weapons in 1957. How could they have blown us up as he asserted in the second part of that statement?

Consider next, concerning their second and third contentions, we found according to Mr. Hilsman that he thinks we ought to retain that option. Now he may think they [covert operations] are a gimmick on one page, but on another page he agrees with Dulles's testimony, that being that for those two reasons we ought to keep the option to counter communist offensives through covert operations. Mr. Hilsman said, in effect, that we should keep that option, and the gentlemen don't deny the point. Next, we found out exposure, according to the gentlemen, would work to counter communist offensives, never explaining how, why, when, or where that that exposure has actually worked.

Consider next Indonesia. We turn to the 1965 example. The gentlemen say we didn't sustain our point. Mike demonstrates the importance of the area. Concerning Guiana, the gentleman once again reasserts his point. I have already demonstrated the inconsistency of their analysis.

Consider now the plan objections. First of all, that they indict only CIA operations. He said, no, we indict all operations. No you don't, because every single one of your examples is a CIA operation. I want you to prove that all of your analysis applies to the DIA as well; that is something you failed to do.

Secondly, that it is not unique to executive control. He said the executive authorizes it. And so he does. The point is that they are indicting the policy and not the control itself, and that is the dichotomy that was never considered.

Next that the harms are not inherent to operations; they can also result from spying. Here we found, first, that we could be blamed anyway. And the gentleman doesn't deny the point, that they can accuse us and blame us for those things. We saw the precedent in the Middle East. We also saw that that could be used for propaganda value. Next the gentleman says, where is the value in favor of that intelligence? That was pointed out by the *New York Times* study which suggested it is necessary to make the overall intelligence pattern meaningful. Next he talked about the National Student Association, and I would suggest here that same harm could have occurred. Turn to *Newsweek*, February 27, 1967: "... the CIA ... funneled \$3 million to the NSA since 1952. . . . What it brought was, principally, a credible public U.S. counterpoise to the Communists in world student affairs—plus some discreetly private intelligence reports on rising young political leaders

abroad."<sup>69</sup> We could still have affected the innocents in that case. Simply say the reason we are buying them off is to get us intelligence reports, but the gentlemen's same example could have resulted even with their plan.

Thirdly, threats to the peace, and here concerning the innocents also, the gentleman said I didn't give any examples. Now look, what is wrong with the reasoning? The reasoning is, a country is going to be suspicious of things like overflights, and there is one example of spying that could be misinterpreted. Secondly, they can also be just as suspicious of spies as they are of people who are operatives, and condemn them to death. The gentlemen didn't deny the analysis. We can't separate. The gentleman says it is going to be illegal. That's fine; it is inherent in the process of intelligence that it spills over, not in the statutory construction, which the gentleman misses.

Next, I suggested that we would increase reliance upon overt intervention. And get this: The gentleman said the reason we use covert operations is because we are afraid. He doesn't prove the point. Look, we use covert operations today because we try them first and, if they fail, we can use an overt intervention. But the gentlemen remove the first part of the option. They force us to go directly to overt intervention. They don't remove the desire to affect the internal structure of other countries.

I suggest they can't guarantee an advantage, meeting of a need, or the removal of serious disadvantages. [ap-  
plause]

#### *Second Affirmative Rebuttal:*

Joel Perwin, Harvard

Let me begin by telling you how honored Dave, Mike, Rich, and I are to be

<sup>69</sup> "The CIA and 'The Kiddies'," *Newsweek* (February 27, 1967), 25.

here for you in the National Tournament; we are honored that you came to see us.<sup>70</sup>

Let me begin with the plan objections. First, the gentlemen tell us that we don't indict all covert operations. Indeed, this is no reason to assume that we don't make that distinction, or that there is any distinction to make. Note please the second and third contentions talk only about covert operations. The gentlemen never tell us where the Defense Department has done anything successfully in the past, and the reason is that the CIA is doing it now. They would be doing it under the affirmative plan if we didn't eliminate all covert operations. That is the rationale.

Second, the gentleman says, look, you are only indicting the policy. Correct, but when we strangle the avenue to that policy we reduce executive control. Therein lies the way that we are on the topic.

Third, the gentleman says, look, with respect to your harms, you don't prove that your harms are inherent to covert operations. That's true, we can strengthen communism in many ways. We can also injure innocent people. Some people take rat poisoning by mistake. That in no way indicates that we do not solve a very important harm. We don't think we should be contributing to this problem. Each harm is unique in itself.

Then the gentleman says we will still be blamed. Rich asks, with what harm? All we are given is the assertion that in the Middle East—and I don't care who said it—that in the Middle East the threat of a CIA coup caused the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt. I don't believe it; the judgment is up to you. But finally we suggested that allegations don't hurt

us with respect to the NSA, and the gentleman is not responsive. With respect to the harm to the Nationalists, etcetera, the Chinese are still in Red China. We say that we don't solve the problems that we discuss; we are trying to prevent future harms. We can't go back and correct the errors of the past.

Second, the gentleman says, with respect to innocents, we can still bribe them. We said, number one, it is an assertion that that will realize the same harms that we discussed. But, number two, we challenged the gentlemen to make the value judgment. We said that we should accept the harm of intelligence gathering. Why? Because intelligence gathering is vital to us. That's why we should accept the harms. The gentlemen don't respond to the challenge.

With respect to Indonesia, all they tell us is that Subandrio in Indonesia used us as a scapegoat. That in no way indicates that this threatened peace, injured innocent people, or strengthened the communists. I don't think that the gentlemen are proving that the plan won't solve our harms.

Now the gentleman makes three arguments. Number one, with respect to harm in our national interest and bribery in the U-2 flights, he has still asserted to you that the U-2 flights would threaten peace. We said they were only suspicious, and the gentleman asserts to you that there could be war. They have never proved that our harms can be created even by intelligence gathering. The gentleman says you can't separate intelligence from operations because it spills over, and then has the nerve to assert to you in the last speech that that's inherent to the process. All it said, all the evidence said was that intelligence men sometimes do covert operations. They will not because it is illegal under the affirmative plan. Then we also said that, with respect to intelligence, covert operations

<sup>70</sup> An audience of approximately 400, consisting of students from Northern Illinois University and participants in the National Debate Tournament, heard the debate.

in the field are harmful; they slant information. And the gentleman didn't come back. Finally, he says we will use overt operations. Why? He says because we will have no choice. We asked the gentlemen to show you that President Kennedy would have invaded Cuba, that he would have announced to the world we were overthrowing the Guatemalan regime, that we would have announced to the world that we were going to have a coup in the Middle East. I don't think we would ever have done so. Lyman Kirkpatrick writes that the United States will not intervene overtly where it intervenes covertly or with clandestine means today.<sup>71</sup> And it is logical to assume why not. The gentlemen prove it for you when they say overt intervention is more harmful. He drops his analysis on Reischauer and Hilsman.

Let's return to the need area. Look at those disadvantages. They are based on assertions, and none of them are significant. Finally, the gentleman says, why do you accept Dulles's assertion that the CIA was involved, but not that they were valuable. Can you see Dulles getting up and saying, "Yes, I did all of those things, but they were disastrous to the United States"? [laughter] He directed the CIA. He is not going to say that. The gentlemen make their assertion on the Mid East and nothing else.

And, finally, we go to Laos. Now we say that one-third of the country is in trouble now. The gentleman says, but they are involved with their own problems at the present time. The problems are with the Pathet Lao. If Souvana had control of the country, we wouldn't have

the problems. Then he could stop the infiltration. They don't deny that we cause the harm; they have never denied that.

Second, with respect to Burma, all they say is that it wasn't a long-run harm. We said it was disastrous in the short-run, and they are not responsive.

And, finally, with respect to the Bay of Pigs, all the gentleman says is that if we had used more force, it could have been effective. He asserts that. Roger Hilsman writes that the second strike when the planes had already been dispersed had no hope of achieving its objective.<sup>72</sup> We couldn't have been successful. We were in trouble already. The harms are certainly manifest in the area of communism.

Number two, we injure the innocent. All the gentleman talks about is British Guiana, dropping the NSA and Berlin which they have admitted the significance of all through the debate. And all he says is that there were riots. The riots were against the United States. That is how people were killed. They were anti-US riots, people were killed, and we suggest a harm.

With respect to strengthening communism, all the gentleman says is, how could China bomb us? They didn't have nuclear weapons. They have got a lot of junks. But we would suggest there could have been a conventional war. We said we were on the brink of nuclear war, or on the brink of total war at least. The United States contemplated the use of nuclear weapons. The gentleman isn't responsive to that analysis. Look at those harms; they are totally untouched.

With respect to the second contention, all they want to know is how can publicity best expose them. We read you conclusionary evidence to counter their

<sup>71</sup> Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, *The Real CIA*, p. 185. Speaking of the reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, Kirkpatrick states: "But most vital of all was the failure on the part of the United States government to understand that it could not accomplish with covert or clandestine means that which it was unwilling to attempt with diplomacy or direct military action."

<sup>72</sup> Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, p. 33: "But a second strike, twenty-four hours later, when the planes had been dispersed, hidden, and protected, had no hope at all of achieving such total surprise."



conclusionary evidence that publicity is the best way to stop the communists. No response.

Finally, they reassert their point on Indonesia. I challenged them to show you that the coup would not have taken place anyway. They didn't do that, so the CIA wasn't necessary. And, finally, with respect to Jagan, we said there was no

threat; we said we didn't do anything; and we said we were harmed when we tried to. The gentlemen have two examples that try to counter our value judgment. They dropped the examples and didn't prove them. Without that, they can't prove the judgment. We suggest that we should not accept the costs of covert intervention. [applause]